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Louis Ginzberg once joked (1920: 97) that
The devil, according to Shakespeare, quotes Scripture. But if he is really as clever as he 
is reputed to be, he ought to quote Talmud, as there is hardly any view of life for and 
against which one could not quote the Talmud.
In particular, much ink has been spilled debating whether a given religion – say Judaism or Christianity 
– would favor this or that socio-economic system – for example, capitalism or socialism. One 
mainstream view argues that Judaism is generally in favor of private property, markets, and differential 
prices and wages. If so, Judaism is basically in favor of capitalism (e.g. Sauer and Sauer 2012; Lifshitz 
2012; Paley 2006; Hill 1995: 373f.; Block, Brennan, and Elzinga 1985: 401-459 passim; Block and 
Hexham 1986: 375-461 passim; Tamari 1986, 1987, 1991, 2010).2
However, even if one concedes that Judaism is in favor of capitalism, such a characterization, 
no matter how accurate, is nevertheless extremely vague. For depending on the interpreter, “capitalism” 
can run anywhere from a highly interventionist corporatism (fascism) or a social-democracy (mixed 
economy), all the way to complete laissez-faire. In turn, laissez-faire capitalism could embrace not only 
Lockean or Nozickean minimal night-watchman government (minarchism) but even Gustave de 
Molinari's market-anarchism (anarcho-capitalism). So the statement that Judaism is in favor of 
capitalism really does not say very much. Aaron Levine (1985a, b; 2012) and Meir Tamari (1986, 1987, 
1991, 2010) in particular argue that while Judaism would on the balance favor capitalism, it (Judaism) 
would nevertheless insist on several crucial checks and limitations on free-trade for the sake of justice, 
fairness, and the public good.
In order to accurately assess which socio-economic system Judaism would prefer, one must 
painstakingly analyze each and every individual Jewish law (halakhah) in detail.3 This present article 
aims to do precisely this with regard to one specific set of halakhot (pl.), namely ona'ah – the 
prohibition of charging unfair prices – and hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh– price-controls imposed on 
foodstuffs. These laws are chosen specifically because of all Jewish laws, they are perhaps the most 
apparently contrary to the operation to a free-market.4 We will show that the laws of ona'ah and/or 
hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh5 may in fact institute price-controls, perhaps somewhat similar to the 
famous Medieval “just price” legislation (Kleiman 1987: 23, 39-44; David Friedman in Block, 
Brennan, and Elzinga 1985: 453).6 With respect to this set of laws, Judaism may have to be judged as 
opposed to rather than in favor of capitalism. Furthermore, we will show that in the light of modern 
economic theory, if the law of ona'ah constitutes price-control, then it, like all forms of price-control, 
would be inefficient and self-defeating, accomplishing the opposite of its intention (Coyne and Coyne 
2015a, Schuettinger and Butler 1979, Morton 2001, Rockoff 2008, Levine 2012: 94).
If enforcement of ona'ah and/or hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh price-controls turns out to be 
economically inefficient, an obvious dilemma arises for the Orthodox or traditionally observant Jew: 
what to do when science and religion apparently conflict? It is conventional to accept the possibility of 
conflict between religion and cosmology and biology (evolution),7 but it is not usually realized that a 
similar conflict can exist between religion and economic science. There is an important difference 
between the normative value judgments which any religion is entitled to make (such as that fairness 
ought to prevail over economic efficiency) versus positive-economic statements of strict causality, such 
as “rent control reduces the supply of rental housing” which, if true, no religion may deny. Applying 
the positive-normative distinction to religion, Walter E. Block has argued (1986: 451) that
if it can be shown that the precepts of some religion run counter to these factual 
statements [concerning economics], that is too bad for that particular religion. It is as if 
this religion is on record denying that the earth is round, or that water is composed of 
two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen.
Thus, religion and science may conflict not only in matters of cosmology and biology but also 
economics. Assuming it is true that rent-control reduces the supply of housing, any religion is perfectly 
entitled to argue that it prefers to promote “fair” lower housing prices even at the cost of reducing the 
supply of housing, for this is a normative judgment. This religion would accept the positive findings of 
science but interpret their normative significance and implications differently. What the religion may 
not legitimately do, however, is declare that it aims at promoting the ready availability of housing 
through the imposition of rent-controls. In this case, the religion is not merely disagreeing on the moral 
significance of given scientific fact, but it is denying scientific fact itself. To quote Murray N. Rothbard 
(1970: 4, rpt. in Rothbard 2000 [1974]: 202),
It is no crime to be ignorant of economics, which is, after all, a specialized discipline 
and one that most people consider to be a “dismal science.” But it is totally irresponsible 
to have a loud and vociferous opinion on economic subjects while remaining in this state 
of ignorance.
One is not obliged to accept the normative assumption that ready supply of housing is a good thing, and 
therefore, one is not obligated to oppose rent-control. But that rent-control reduces the supply of 
housing is a scientific fact which cannot be denied without appropriate scientific proof. The religion 
may legitimately deny the positive scientific fact if and only if the rejection is accompanied by 
scientific proof. Whereas in normative matters of subjective judgment and ethical taste, no proof is 
strictly necessary (de gustibus non est disputandum). One is not obligated to scientifically prove the 
normative assertion that low housing prices are preferable to ready availability of housing, but one is 
obligated to prove the positive-scientific claim that rent-control does not reduce the supply of housing. 
Likewise, it requires scientific evidence to refute the positive-scientific claim that artificially low prices 
and ready supply of housing cannot be obtained simultaneously. 
It is crucial to note that we will be analyzing Jewish law as a single, continuous whole, 
considering the Roman-era Mishnah, the Sassanid-era Talmud, and the Medieval codes of Jewish law 
as explaining each other. In other words, we are interested in what living Jewish law has to say for 
practical matters, rather than being concerned with what the historical Mishnah or Talmud meant. There 
is an important distinction to be drawn between the two approaches: on the one hand, one could isolate 
specific statements in the Mishnah or Talmud and situate them in their historical contexts according to 
the identities of their named-authors. On the other hand, one may consider Jewish literature as a 
continuous unity and study it in a relatively ahistorical fashion. Ephraim Kleiman's study of ona'ah 
(1987) takes the historical approach and notes that other scholars have taken the unity approach 
(Kleiman 1987: 25 n. 2). This present article will take the unity approach, for our concern is not with 
what the specific authors of the Mishnah or Talmud meant as individuals, but instead with how living, 
evolving Jewish law has understood them. Thus, this article will analyze what may be the most anti-
market legislation in Judaism, viz. ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh, and judge just how 
anti-market those laws actually are. If these laws constitute price-controls, then this is a strong 
argument that Judaism may not reconcilable with capitalism.
This paper is organized as follows: section I summarizes the laws of ona'ah and hafka'at 
she'arim / hayyei nefesh, to establish the basic characteristics of these laws but without subjecting them 
to any critical analysis. Section II evaluates ona'ah to determine its purpose and intention and to judge 
whether it constitutes a price-control or not. Section III does the same for hafka'at she'arim / hayyei 
nefesh. We shall find that ona'ah is not a price-control but that hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh is one. 
Section IV evaluates price-controls in general according to contemporary economic theory, 
demonstrating the significance of the finding that hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh is a price-control. 
Section V discusses halakhic (Jewish legal) restrictions on middlemen and speculators, showing that 
these restrictions are damaging as well, similarly to price-controls. Section VI is a philosophical 
discussion of what it means for price-controls and other economic regulations to be self-defeating, and 
in particular, how the halakhic economic regulations previously discussed defeat the specific Jewish 
ethical goals they are meant to accomplish. Section VII criticizes one author's attempt to rehabilitate 
hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh and demonstrate that it is not a price-control. This paper argues that 
that author's attempt must be judged unsuccessful, and that hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh really is a 
price-control after all. Section VIII discusses a few sundry matters tangentially related to ona'ah, 
including rent-controls, minimum wages, and how ona'ah has influenced Israeli law. Section IX 
investigates whether these Jewish laws are still in force today, whether they still possess any binding 
authority. This section concludes that some of these laws lie in desuetude, but that others are still 
problematically authoritative. Section X concludes.
I. The Laws of Ona'ah and Hafka'at She'arim / Hayyei Nefesh Summarized
First, we must explore the history of Talmudic price-regulation in general, especially ona'ah and 
hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh.8 Menachem Elon summarizes the general history of Talmudic price-
legislation as follows (Elon 2008):9
It would seem that in the mishnaic period there were fixed prices, apparently determined 
by a competent authority (BM [Bava Metzia] 4:12, 5:7). There is evidence that in 
Jerusalem – prior to the destruction of the Temple – the market commissioners “did not 
supervise prices but [weights and] measures only” (Tosef. [Tosefta], BM 6:14); in 
Babylonia (at the commencement of the third century C.E.) there was supervision of 
prices at the instigation of the exilarch (TJ [Palestinian Talmud], BB [Bava Batra] 5:11, 
15a; TB [Babylonian Talmud], BB 89a). The sages of that period were divided, however, 
on this matter. Some expressed the opinion that “price inspectors do not need to be 
appointed” and that competition between merchants would suffice to stabilize the price 
while others were of the opinion that it was incumbent on the court to supervise the 
prices because of the “swindlers” who hoarded commodities toward a time when they 
might be in short supply in order to sell them at a high price (TJ and TB, BB 89a). Over 
the course of time the view favoring price supervision apparently became generally 
accepted (BB 89a; Yoma 9a) and thus it was decided in the codes: “But the court is 
obliged to determine prices and to appoint commissioners for this purpose, to prevent 
everyone from charging what he likes …” ([Maimonides] Yad [i.e. Mishneh Torah], 
[Hilkhot] Mekhirah 14:1; Tur and Sh. Ar. [Shulhan Arukh], HM [Hoshen Mishpat] 
231:20).
Notice some were of the opinion that “competition between merchants would suffice” (cf. Tamari 
1987: 94), but that this opinion was eventually rejected by the Rabbinic consensus until “the view 
favoring price supervision apparently became generally accepted” in order to regulate prices and “to 
prevent everyone from charging what he likes.” Furthermore, that additional opprobrium and concern 
was directed at speculators, the “'swindlers' who hoarded commodities toward a time when they might 
be in short supply in order to sell them at a high price.” 
Shmuel Shilo defines ona'ah in particular as “the act of wronging another by selling him an 
article for more than its real worth or by purchasing from him an article for less than its real worth” 
(Shilo and Elon 2008).10 Ephraim Kleiman defines ona'ah as “exploitation through price deceit” 
(Kleiman 1987: 25).11 Ona'ah is based on an interpretation of the verse in Leviticus 25:14, “And if thou 
sell aught unto thy neighbor, or buy of thy neighbor's hand, ye shall not wrong (tonu) one another” 
(Hil. Mekhira 12:1; Shilo and Elon 2008; Kleiman 1987: 25). There are three different degrees of 
prohibited ona'ah.12 First is where the discrepancy between the sale price and the official market price 
is more than one-sixth, whether above or below, i.e. whether over- or under-charging.13 In this case, the 
sale is null-and-void. Secondly, where the sale and market price differ by exactly this amount, in which 
case the transaction is binding but the victim is entitled to restitution of the full amount of the ona 'ah, 
i.e. the amount of the prohibited one-sixth discrepancy. The third case is where there is less than a one-
sixth discrepancy between sale and official market price; here, the sale is binding, and the injured party 
has no claim to compensation. There is a dispute among the Jewish authorities whether a discrepancy 
less than one-sixth is permitted or whether it is forbidden but non-actionable (Levine 2012: 54f.).
Meanwhile, closely related to ona'ah is another law, that banning hafka'at she'arim or 
“profiteering” – also known as the law ensuring access to food essential for the sustenance of hayyei 
nefesh or “life of the soul.”14 Menachem Elon defines hafka'at she'arim (profiteering) as “raising the 
price of a commodity beyond the accepted level, or that fixed by a competent authority” (Elon 2008). 
Similarly, Itamar Warhaftig says (1987: sec. “1”) that “a profiteer is one who causes the prices to rise in 
an artificial manner” and that the halakhah restricted “someone who causes prices to rise without 
economic justification.” 
Whereas ona'ah is a Biblical prohibition which may be waived in certain cases by the parties 
involved, hafka'at she'arim is a Rabbinic enactment reinforcing the prohibition of ona'ah by forbidding 
the parties from voluntarily waiving ona'ah in certain situations (Elon 2008).15 16 Furthermore, whereas 
ona'ah applies to nearly all goods and commodities whatsoever – with but a few exceptions, 
specifically real estate, slaves, bills, and consecrated objects (Hil. Mekhira 13:8-18, Kleiman 1987: 30, 
Shilo and Elon 2008, Warhaftig 1988: sec. “C. Exceptions”, Lew 1995: 43, Tamari 1991: 76)17 – by 
contrast, hafka'at she'arim applies only to essential foodstuffs (Hil. Mekhira 14:1-2, quoted in Tamari 
1991: 77; Elon 2008; Tamari 1987: 88).18 To summarize: ona'ah is a Biblical prohibition which 
prohibits certain degrees of over- or under-charging on all commodities except real estate, slaves, bill, 
and consecrated objects, but the parties to the transaction may waive the prohibition if there is mutual 
consent. Hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh, by contrast, is a Rabbinic prohibition similar prohibiting 
over- or under-charging, but only for foodstuffs, and this prohibition cannot be waived, not even by the 
mutual consent of the parties.
Notice that the restrictions on permissible price seem to be with respect to a fixed, official price, 
not with respect to the costs incurred in production or acquisition. This is the view of Maimonides, and 
while it is the most prominent view, relied on by most authorities, there is another view. According to 
the Rashbam, one is prohibited to make a profit of more than one-sixth with respect to the costs he has 
incurred.19 According to this second view that ona'ah is cost-based, ona'ah is not a form of direct price-
control, but rather it is a form of profit-limitation, aimed especially against middlemen.20 However, 
many of the same sorts of objections to price-controls would apply to both interpretations of ona'ah, for 
if ona'ah turns out to constitute a price-control, then these two interpretations would merely have the 
mandated price be calculated on a different basis. Whether one restricts prices based on an officially 
fixed permissible sale price or whether based on costs of production and acquisition, either way, the 
result is a form of price-control. The question we will investigate is whether ona'ah is indeed a price-
control at all.
Returning to the view of Maimonides that ona'ah is calculated based on some official price, it is 
not entirely clear, however, whether the fixed price is to be set arbitrarily, or whether it is supposed to 
bear some relation to the actual price level in the marketplace. Nor is it clear whether the ona'ah price 
is publicly announced or whether market participants must research the ona'ah price for themselves at 
their own expense. As Ephraim Kleiman notes (1987: 26), “nowhere does the Talmud explicitly 
mention the reference price from which such a divergence is to be measured.” Warhaftig (1988: sec. 
“Introduction”) is equivocal on the matter, saying, “The correct price is officially set by the authorities 
or is the prevailing price in the marketplace.” Elsewhere, Warhaftig (1987: sec. “C. Summation and 
Application”) is more sure: according to the consensus view (inc. Maimonides), “the prices of essential 
items are fixed by the authorities,” and it is only in the view of Rashbam, he says, that prices are set by 
the market, because for Rashbam, ona'ah restricts profit with respect to costs, not a fixed price. 
Kleiman (1987: 26) disagrees, saying, “the relevant standard was none other than the going market 
price.”21 Levine (2012: 53) agrees with Kleiman, saying, “the reference price for an ona'ah claim is 
nothing other than the competitive norm.” However, neither Kleiman nor Levine reveal how this 
competitive norm is to be discovered when goods are heterogeneous and not all prices for a given good 
are identical.
Perhaps the intention of the law was that the courts would officially ratify as the fixed legal 
price whatever the prevailing market price already happened to be. In other words, when the courts 
thought that a general market rate had become settled (yatzah ha-sha'ar – cf. Levine 2012: 97), perhaps 
they would officially promulgate this as the fixed price, and any deviations from this price were 
considered ona'ah (cf. Kleiman 1987: 37). Indeed, discussing hafka'at she'arim, Maimonides declares 
(Hil. Mekhira 14:1), “the beit din is obligated to fix prices,” which implies a publicly promulgated 
official price. Similarly, Maimonides wrote elsewhere that “the court is required to … set the prices” 
(Warhaftig 1987, quoting Hilkhot Geneiva 8:20 and SA HM 231:20-21). Likewise, discussing hafka'at 
she'arim, Levine says (2012: 93), “the hayyei nefesh [essential foodstuffs] edict required the Jewish 
court to appoint price commissioners to supervise the marketplace.”22 Tamari (1987: 95) speaks of 
when “a new communally adjusted price is announced.” Later, discussing ona'ah, Tamari similarly 
speaks of a publicly announced price, saying (1987: 97), “A just price cannot exist unless there exists a 
fixed price set through some legislative machinery.” 
However, the halakhah also specifies that the victim of ona'ah has only a limited time to object 
to the over- or under-charge, according to how long it is estimated it would take him to verify the 
proper price with an expert (Hil. Mekhira 12: 5-11; Warhaftig 1988: sec. “B. Period of Cancellation”; 
Kleiman 1987: 26; Tamari 1987: 97f.; Tamari 1991: 78; Weissman 1998: 86-88). This implies that there 
is no officially posted price which can be easily looked up on a public bulletin, but rather, that the law 
of ona'ah enforces whatever the market price may happen to be, and that a person must verify for 
himself what that price actually is (Kleiman 1987: 34 n. 19).23 So it may be that no fixed price was 
officially established at all, and instead, it was assumed that the market price would speak for itself. In 
summary, it is not clear whether ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim envision a publicly declared official 
price, or whether it assumes that the correct price is something which exists independently and 
objectively on its own. Perhaps the prices for the two laws were fixed in two entirely different manners, 
with the ona'ah price being something market participants must discover for themselves (cf. Hil. 
Mekhira 12: 5-11), but the hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh price being officially dictated and 
announced (cf. Hil. Mekhira 14: 1).
It is crucial to note as well that apart from the beit din (rabbinical court)'s authority to enforce 
ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh, there is a wholly distinct power resting in the corporate, 
(relatively) democratic Jewish community (Epstein 1985: i-ii; Warhaftig 1987: s.v. “6. Price Fixing”; 
Levine 2012: 202) to regulate wages and prices (Hil. Mekhira 14:9, quoted by Levine 2012: 108; 
Levine 2012: 202; Lew 1985: 126; Elon 2008). As Meir Tamari notes (1991: 68), “the people of the 
city have the right to fix prices (either by majority vote for through their representatives)” (cf. Tamari 
1987: 94). Itamar Warhaftig (1987 s.v. “6. Price Fixing”) quotes Tosefta BM 11:12: “The members of 
the community may determine prices and measures and wages, and they may enforce their decisions...” 
Similarly, Aaron Levine (2012: 108) quotes Maimonides, Hilkhot Mekhira 14:9 (cf. Tamari 1987: 94): 
The residents of the city may agree among themselves to fix a price for any article they 
desire, even for meat and bread, and to stipulate that they will inflict such-and-such 
penalty upon one who violates the agreement.
Crucially, Aaron Levine comments on Hil. Mekhira 14:9, saying (Levine 2012: 108), “communal price-
fixing legislation in the hayyei nefesh [i.e. essentials] sector may conflict with the 20% profit rate the 
Beit Din of the town sets for this sector” in enforcing the law of ona'ah or hafka'at she'arim / hayyei 
nefesh. This appears to be a straightforward, unambiguous power to impose wage and price controls 
even beyond the controls already imposed by the laws of ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh.
It is not entirely clear whether ona'ah applies to wages as well. According to Shmuel Shilo, “it 
was laid down as halakhah that the law of overreaching [i.e. ona'ah] does not apply to the hire of 
laborers” (Elon and Shilo 2008, citing Yad, Mekhirah, 13:15). Aaron Levine concurs that ona'ah does 
not apply to most forms of wage-labor (Levine 2012: 193-197, 209). On the other hand, Itamar 
Warhaftig (1988, sec. “2. Transactions,” s.v. “b) employment”) notes that there are opinions on either 
side regarding whether wages are subject to ona'ah. But regardless, the corporate Jewish community 
did have the power to impose wage and price controls by some sort of (semi-)democratic procedure, 
entirely apart from the beit din's enforcement of ona'ah, as we saw earlier. Thus, Meir Tamari (1987: 
149) quotes the Talmud, BB 8b: “The people of the city are permitted to regulate weights, prices, and 
the wages of workers. They also have the power to punish those who do not carry out their 
regulations.”24 Whether ona'ah applies to wages or not and whether ona'ah is a form of price-control or 
not, in any case wages were still subject to some form of price-control.25
II. Ona'ah Evaluated
With the basic characteristics of the laws now summarized, we will first evaluate whether 
ona'ah constitutes a price-control. According to several interpreters, ona'ah is not meant as a price-
control which bans deviations from the official price. Instead, it is only a measure meant to protect 
market participants from ignorance and asymmetric information.26 This interpretation of ona'ah is 
based on an important exemptions to the law. Shmuel Shilo explains (Shilo and Elon 2008):
A stipulation between the parties stating, “on condition that there is no [prohibition of] 
overreaching [i.e. ona'ah] therein” (i.e., in the transaction), or “on condition that you 
have no claim of overreaching against me,” is invalid (Sh. Ar., ḤM 227:21),27 since the 
language used implies a stipulation contrary to a prohibition laid down in the Torah and 
one may not stipulate to set aside the Pentateuchal law; however, when the amounts 
involved in the transaction are specified, a stipulation of this nature is valid, since the 
injured party knows the precise amount of the overreaching to which he waives his 
right, and all stipulations in monetary matters are valid. … There is no [prohibition of] 
overreaching [i.e. ona'ah] as regards “one who trades on trust” [nosei be-emunah] (BM 
51b). “How so? If the seller said to the purchaser 'I purchased this article for so and so 
much and I wish to earn thereon so and so much,' the purchaser will have no claim 
against him for overreaching” (Arukh ha-Shulḥan [HM] 227:28), “even if the 
overreaching amounts to more than one-sixth” (Yad, Mekhirah 14:1).
In other words, one cannot contractually stipulate that the very prohibition of ona'ah itself is nullified, 
but “one who trades on trust,” the nosei be-emunah can specify precisely how much he – the seller – is 
over- or under-changing, and even if the discrepancy is greater than one-sixth, since the precise 
magnitude has been made explicit to the other person, the sale is legal.
The fact that ona'ah can be circumvented by full-disclosure shows that ona'ah is not meant as a 
price-control but as a protection against asymmetric information (Weissman 1998: 90).28 For example, 
Meir Tamari argues (1991: 82; cf. 1987: 96f., 1986: 408)
This view of the law of ona'ah primarily as a legal protection against exploitation, rather 
than an intervention in the price-fixing mechanism of the market, may be seen in the 
ruling of Maimonides. He rules that there can be no claim of ona'ah in those cases 
where it was made perfectly clear that the price charged was above the market rate of 
1/6 or more. In other words, once full disclosure has been made, there is no longer any 
question of exploitation or oppression.
Similarly, Warhaftig (1988: sec. “Introduction”) argues that ona'ah only applies when “one of the sides 
to the transaction is not aware that he is paying more or receiving less than that price.” And again, 
Warhaftig (1988: sec. “A. Definition”) states that the prohibition of ona'ah only applies when “the 
victim was not aware of the fraud and therefore it cannot be claimed that he waived or agreed to pay 
more than the market price.” Finally, Warhaftig (1988: sec. “D. Stipulation and Waiver”) concludes 
that,
Fraud is based on the withholding of information. It follows that if, for example, the 
seller explicitly stipulates that the price is higher than the market price, and the buyer 
accepts this, the laws of ona'ah are inapplicable.29
Furthermore, as Seth Winslow Weissman notes (1998: 87), the fact that the victim of ona'ah is given a 
deadline by which time he must have consulted an expert to appraise the value of his purchase, after 
which time he loses his claim, shows that ona'ah is meant to protect against asymmetric information.
Ephraim Kleiman (1987) has perhaps the most detailed argument that this is the intent of the 
law of ona'ah. After quoting TB BB 51b concerning the nosei be-emunah (1987: 29), the one who 
waives ona'ah by disclosing the discrepancy, Kleiman concludes that the law of ona'ah “seems to have 
been intended only to prevent sharp dealers from taking advantage of the customers' lack of 
information concerning the current market price.” He notes that the immediately following discussion 
in the Talmud is one prohibiting mixing new and old produce together in order to make the old produce 
falsely appear new, which he says (1987: 29) would “amount to what we would call in modern parlance 
truth in advertising or fair-trade regulations.” Interpreting the laws of ona'ah and fair-appearance 
together, Kleiman concludes (1987: 29)
Their aim was to ensure that transactions took place under conditions of, as far as 
possible, full information. And in the view of the Mishna, this applied not only to the 
quality of goods traded but also to their prices.
In addition, Weissman and Kleiman both note the existence of one opinion that merchants were 
not to protected by ona'ah, but only consumers, because merchants are experts (Kleiman 1987: 28 and 
Weissman 1998:88f., both quoting TB BM 51a). Although this is not the accepted by the Talmud as the 
final law (cf. Hil. Mekhira 12:8), Kleiman and Weissman argue that even the rejected opinion reveals a 
consensus concerning the underlying purpose of the law, viz. to protect the weak and ignorant against 
exploitation by those with superior knowledge. Furthermore, Kleiman argues that the Talmudic laws of 
interest as applied to futures markets demonstrate an appreciation by the Talmud that prices do 
fluctuate in a market (Kleiman 1987: 33-38) and he argues (1987: 38) that
We may thus conclude that the price which was supposed to serve as the reference 
standard for overcharging was the shortest of all short-run market ones - the one 
obtaining at the particular locality and particular moment at which the transaction 
concerned was effected. Such a price has little to be said for it on either equity or 
efficiency grounds. The ethics of the ona'ah rule applied not to the price itself, but to the 
withholding of information about it.
If this is the purpose of ona'ah, then it is not a price-control at all. According to this 
interpretation, the law of ona'ah is not meant to ban deviations from a given price, but only to ensure 
that market prices are formed under conditions of full information. According to Tamari (1987: 99), 
“the law of ona'ah would seem to require a public policy requiring full disclosure of the market prices 
of basic commodities.” Later, Tamari suggested (1991: 85) that “the law of ona'ah would … seem to 
require communal or government action in order to make information about market prices freely 
available to all.” Thus, it appears that ona'ah would not constitute a problematic price-control (contra 
Block 1986, 1990, 2002).
Nevertheless, there are a few other potential problems with the prohibition which are worth 
pointing out. First, we should ask, is it moral to force merchants to give away information for free? 
Market research is costly, so why should merchants be forced to give their data away for free? The 
fundamental nature of entrepreneurship is acting on the basis of information and knowledge that not 
everyone else possesses (Kirzner 1973). Permitting merchants to profit on the basis of private 
information therefore serves as an incentive to discover new information and capitalize that 
information in new products. Therefore, the prohibition of ona'ah may serve as an undesirable 
disincentive against entrepreneurial activity (Block 1986, 1990 and 2002).30
Second, if producers and sellers are required to undertake market research at their own expense 
and to divulge the results of that information, it will be nearly impossible to know whether the cost is 
worth the benefit. Consumers will benefit, to be sure, but it may be that their benefit will be less than 
the cost undertaken by the sellers, and society will, on net, suffer a loss, not a gain. It would be 
preferable for a private firm to undertake market research and sell the results of their research to 
subscribers. In this way, it is feasible to way costs against benefits. If the money a person saves by 
subscribing to the market research bulletin is greater than the cost of the subscription fee, then there is a 
net benefit. But if the subscription fee is more costly than the savings one gets by having access to the 
information, then there is a net loss. By relying on the private market and the forces of supply-and-
demand, one ensures that expensive and costly market research will be undertaken if and only if the 
benefits outweigh the costs. Making market research compulsory forestalls this process and creates the 
risk that research will be undertaken even when the costs exceed the benefits.
Third, in requiring the merchant to disclose the true cost or value of his wares, the law of 
ona'ah seems to presume the existence of a single “true” price that is distinct from the variable and 
indefinite market price. According to Warhaftig (1988: sec. “A. Definition”), one of the “assumptions 
at the base of this law” is that “there exists a standard market price from which the sale price deviated 
by a sixth or more.” But in fact, no such “standard market price” can possibly exist, and it is impossible 
to distinguish meaningfully between the generalized market price and the specific sale price. For a 
market is nothing but the collection of the individual interactions and transactions between willing 
participants, and so sale prices are not arbitrary and capricious deviations from some primeval, abstract 
market price. Instead, those sale prices embody valuable information, and those sales transactions are 
the market. The market is not something that exists independently of the sales that occur within the 
market. To the contrary, the market is the aggregation of those very same sales. To distinguish between 
the market price and the sale price makes as much sense as distinguishing between the temperature of 
the ocean and the temperature of the water in the ocean; the one is composed of the other. Therefore, 
scientifically speaking, the market price at any given time is the sale price. In other words, the market 
price of a good is only what it actually sells for in a given, specific transaction. Prices emerge from the 
confluence of supply and demand, and every price communicates valuable and unique information 
about the conditions of the market at that place and at that time (Hayek 1945, 1948). Every market 
transaction is unique, a sui generis event, and its price communicates essential data. Therefore, 
scientifically speaking, there is only one way to determine what the market price is: find out the latest 
terms of sale.
Fourth, a regulation aimed at reducing information asymmetry, no matter how laudable in 
intention, will encourage the growth of a rent-seeking bureaucracy with a vested interest in discovering 
or manufacturing as many cases of information asymmetry as it can. This bureaucracy will seek to 
diagnose price differentials as illegal consequences of information asymmetry even when the true cause 
is legal product differentiation. In other words, the interests of the bureacracy will be promoted if price 
differentials are misdiagnosed as symptoms of information asymmetry instead of correctly diagnosed 
as consequences of  product differentiation. Public Choice economics demonstrates that we cannot rely 
on the bureaucracy in charge of enforcing ona'ah to be immune to self-interested motivation. There 
will tend to arise cases where a merchant neglected to disclose the different prices of his competitors' 
non-identical competing products because the merchant reasoned that the difference in price was due to 
the differing qualities of their products. But the ona'ah-enforcing bureaucracy will wish to argue that 
the non-identical products are more similar to each other than the merchant thought, and that therefore, 
the price differences are due to information asymmetry, not product differentiation. Therefore, the 
bureaucracy will say, the merchant is at fault for failing to make an ona'ah disclosure. The ona'ah 
regulation will therefore create a incentive for the government to manufacture spurious opportunities 
for legal action against innocent merchants. 
In summary, even if ona'ah is not a price-control but simply a measure to reduce information 
asymmetry, there are still at least four problems with such a regulation: it may be unethical and unfair 
because it deprives merchants of the rewards for successful entrepreneurship, it may encourage over-
investment in market research to a point where the costs exceed the benefits, it will require the 
merchant to discover and divulge information which really doesn't exist at all, and it will promote the 
evolution of a rent-seeking bureaucracy with a vested interest in manufacturing opportunities for 
government legal action against innocent parties.
Some scholars have caught a glimpse of the problem which heterogeneity poses to the law of 
ona'ah, but they have sometimes failed to realize its full significance. Meir Tamari (1986: 408; cf. 
Tamari 1987: 98) explains the Talmudic exemptions of sales of land, slaves, bills, and consecrated 
property from ona'ah as follows: “It may well be that the economic reason for this lies in the difficulty 
of assigning a price to these articles in view of the subjective evaluation involved.” To this, Walter E. 
Block replied (1986: 439), “Tamari quite correctly sees the 'difficulty of assigning a price to [certain] 
articles in view of the subjective evaluation involved.' … He fails, however, to realize that subjective 
evaluations and differing attitudes toward risk apply to all purchases and sales in the market.”31 
Similarly, Kleiman argues (1987: 30) concerning the exempted goods that “characteristic of all of them 
was the lack of a uniform market price.” But Kleiman does not notice that “the lack of a uniform 
market price” is characteristic of all goods, not only the goods which the Talmud exempted from 
ona'ah.32
If goods and market conditions are heterogeneous and constantly changing, then it is 
meaningless to speak of the “true” price of a good, and therefore, ona'ah cannot be reasonably 
enforced.33 Indeed, according to Warhaftig (1988: sec. “G. Contemporary Application”),
The law of price fraud, as developed in Jewish law, is based on two basic assumptions: 
a) The existence of a market price for the product; b) The ignorance of the buyer of the 
market price. Both these assumptions are problematic in a modern market. Can we 
speak of a market price today, when prices change from place to place and from time to 
time, and every seller does what he pleases? … [O]na'ah can be measured only for 
standardized products. In the conditions of a modern market, a seller can claim in many 
cases that his product cannot be compared to that of his competitors, and it is the 
responsibility of the plaintiff to prove that they are indeed equivalent.
Warhaftig concludes (1988: end of sec. “C. Exceptions”) that “in most cases today it is impossible to 
establish a market price.” Furthermore, he states (ibid. s.v. “G. Contemporary Applications”) that “in a 
completely free market, where every merchant has his own price[, t]here is is no market price, and 
therefore no ona'ah.”34 35 Menachem Elon makes a similar argument that ona'ah is not applicable to a 
modern market, saying (Shilo and Elon 2008)
The unique nature of the prohibition against overreaching is expressed by the conditions 
of its application: (1) The article to be sold must have a known market value; (2) the 
buyer must be unaware of this market value. These conditions severely impede the 
implementation of the law in our times, as the vast majority of items sold do not have a 
fixed, uniform price, and prices may vary considerably from place to place and among 
different vendors. Furthermore, a buyer would have difficulty in convincing a court that 
he did not know that prices of goods are likely to vary.
In conclusion, it would appear that the law of ona'ah is not legally binding because goods are 
essentially heterogeneous and there is no such thing as “the” true price of a good. It is not merely the 
case that merchants can easily circumvent the prohibition of ona'ah by disclosing the extent of their 
over- or under-charge relative to the “true” price – although this is true. Rather, it is that there is no 
“true” price to begin with, and merchants have nothing to admit, and the law of ona'ah is no longer 
legally in force.36
III. Hafka'at She'arim / Hayyei Nefesh Evaluated
As we have seen, ona'ah does not constitute a price-control because the prohibition is waived 
upon full-disclosure. However, the same is not true of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh, the price-
limitation on foodstuffs.
Whereas ona'ah may be waived, hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh cannot. As Warhaftig says (1988: 
sec. “F. Fraud...”), “Profit limitation is an obligation not subject to change through stipulation or 
waiver, unlike ona'ah.” And in the words of Maimonides (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Mekhira 14:1, trans. 
Levine 2012: 102):
We have already explained that he who does business on trust (nosei be-emunah) and 
says “I make so much and so much profit” is not subject to the law of overreaching 
(ona'ah), and even if he says “I bought this article for a sela and am selling it to you for 
ten,” it is legitimate.37 Nevertheless, the court is obligated to regulate prices38 [lifsok ha-
she'arim] and appoint officers of the law, so that people at large will not be able to reap 
whatever profit they desire, but should earn a profit of only one-sixth [i.e. 20%].
Maimonides immediately proceeds to clarify that this only applies to essential foodstuffs (Hil. Mekhira 
14:2). According to Aaron Levine (2012: 104),
Maimonides conveys the notion that the price ceiling for hayyei nefesh items [i.e. 
essential foodstuffs covered by hafka'at she'arim] is absolute and precludes the 
possibility for S and B to strike a deal that effectively allows S to earn a profit in excess 
of 20%.
Whereas is permitted to commit ona'ah as long as one specifies the precise extent of the over-charge, in 
the specific case of foodstuffs, the rabbinical courts are required to enforce the one-sixth law of 
hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh even when the market participants themselves wish to waive it. 
Quoting the Medieval commentator Rabbi Menahem ha-Meiri, Menachem Elon (2008) 
summarizes the distinction between ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh as follows: whereas 
ona'ah is a Torah prohibition which applies to all goods (except land, slaves, bills, and consecrated 
property),
The law of profiteering [i.e. hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh] on the other hand has its 
source in rabbinic enactment designed to prohibit the setting of prices in excess of the 
customarily accepted ones, even if the purchaser is aware of and agrees to the inflated 
price; “… even when he [the seller] says 'it cost me one sela and I want to earn two on 
it,' he has not transgressed the law of ona'ah but he is prohibited by rabbinic enactment 
[of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh] from making a profit of more than one-sixth in 
essential commodities” ([Meiri,] Beit ha-Behirah, BM 51b).
So even though ona'ah does not constitute a price-control, hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh is – 
on the contrary – most definitely a price-control. Whereas ona'ah is designed only to protect against 
information asymmetry, hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh is a full-blown control of prices. Indeed, 
Maimonides speaks explicitly of “appoint[ing] officers” because “the court is obligated to regulate 
prices.” Hence, Meyer S. Lew (1985: 42) states that “Maimonides ruled that punishment was to be 
meted out to those who raised prices. The community was duty bound to regulate commodity prices.”39 
Similarly, Meir Tamari appears to be discussing hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh when he states (1991: 
68; cf. 1987: 94, 1991: 70) that “The obligation of the beit din [rabbinical court] to appoint officials 
who, in addition to their role as supervisors of weights and measures, will control prices of basic goods 
is recognized by all the codes.”40
Moreover, as we saw earlier, the corporate, (relatively) democratic Jewish community (Epstein 
1985: i-ii; Warhaftig 1987: s.v. “6. Price Fixing”) possesses the power to regulate wages and prices 
independently of the beit din (rabbinical court)'s enforcement of the laws of ona'ah and hafka'at 
she'arim / hayyei nefesh (Hil. Mekhira 14:9, quoted by Levine 2012: 108; Warhaftig 1987 s.v. “6. Price 
Fixing” quoting Tosefta BM 11:12; Lew 1985: 126; Elon 2008; Tamari 1991: 68, 1987: 94). This 
appears to be a straightforward, unambiguous power to impose wage and price controls even beyond 
any controls already imposed by the laws of ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh. In short, 
while ona'ah may not be a price-control, hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh certainly is one.41 And the 
community's power to impose wage and price controls is exactly that. But we must ask, what would the 
economic effects of these laws be? Would these effects be desirable? And would these effects run 
counter to the intentions behind these laws?
IV. Price-Controls in Economics42
As we saw, hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh specifically fixes the prices of essential foodstuffs, 
and this gives us an insight into the intention of the law: presumably the law is meant to ensure a stable 
and reliable food supply especially for the poorest and weakest of society and especially in times of 
famines and other disasters. The question is, are the means appropriate to the ends? Because essentials 
are vital for the maintenance of life, the goal of the Rabbis was presumably to make sure they are 
always available. But since luxuries are not so important, it is not so crucial to guarantee continual 
access. However, the problem with adopting price controls for the necessities and allowing a free 
market for luxuries, is that paradoxically, the very opposite results will obtain than what was intended. 
That is, price controls are actually an impediment to continued supply of a good, while economic 
freedom is the best guarantee, at least on this side of the Garden of Eden, that shortages will not arise 
(Walker 1976). And so in fact, the means adopted – i.e. enforcement of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei 
nefesh – are absolutely incompatible with the presumed ends of the Rabbis. Enforcement of hafka'at 
she'arim / hayyei nefesh would result in the very opposite of what was intended, and tragically so. 
Establishing and enforcing price-controls in essentials while allowing a free-market in luxuries will 
produce a paradox of continued plentiful supply of luxuries while essentials will dwindle into 
insufficiency, exactly the situation that was sought to be avoided. One may visit contemporary (early 
2016) Venezuela for an idea of what this looks like.
The problem with all price controls is that prices – i.e. rates of exchange between two goods, or 
one good and money – have an essential role to play in an economy.43 Without exaggeration, they are 
the only means by which a large-scale society can function. The sole alternative to prices is central 
planning,44 but ever since the unraveling of the Soviet Union, most people are properly suspicious of 
central planning.45 Suppose that for some reason there is a surplus of mechanics and a shortage of 
electricians. The way the price system handles such a challenge is simplicity itself. The wage of 
mechanics falls, and that of electricians rises. This leads people who have attained or can attain both 
skills to switch from the former to the latter. Over the long-term, students just entering trade school will 
tend to decide to study to become electricians instead of mechanics, on account of the higher wages in 
the former. Similarly, if there is a great demand for cabbage and small demand for broccoli relative to 
supply, the price of the former will rise and that of the latter, fall. This will again tend to lead 
entrepreneurs, as if by an “invisible hand,” to tailor their offerings to the wishes of consumers. The 
higher price of cabbage will call forth more of this vegetable, and the lower price of broccoli will 
reduce incentives to bring that product to market, at least on the part of all those who attempt to 
maximize their returns. As for those who ignore these market signals, all other things being equal they 
will tend towards bankruptcy. It is in this way that a decentralized market can function in a rational 
manner without any central direction at all. This may not seem important to some, but it has great 
importance for our welfare; no less than the feeding, clothing and sheltering of the persons of humanity 
is at stake.
Price-controls, of course, prohibit the movement of prices without government permission. But 
in the time it takes for bureaucrats to discern the relative disequilibrium of mechanics and electricians, 
or of cabbage and broccoli – to say nothing of the hundreds of thousands of other items in a modern 
economy – there is no possibility of rectifying matters sufficiently so as to attain a smoothly 
functioning economy. In this regard hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh would not be a total disaster. 
Instead of preventing such price changes, it merely retards them. This Talmudic law allows prices to 
fluctuate plus or minus 20% from the official market price. If resources can be fully allocated by, say, a 
price change of only 10%, then hafka'at she'arim will have no explicit deleterious effect on the 
economy. But if full resource allocation is possible only with a price change of greater than 20%, say of 
30%, then hafka'at she'arim will restrict the change to 20% and prohibit the most efficient use of 
society's resources and will therefore restrict the potential for consumer want-satisfaction.46
Profits are the means by which consumers signal to the producers and suppliers their priorities 
and preferences; and profit-and-loss signals therefore provide essential feedback in the market process 
(Coyne and Coyne 2015b: 9-12). If people come to fear they may not have enough eggs and cheese for 
their growing children, profits in egg and cheese production will rise. This will draw increasing 
investments into this industry – for investors seek profit opportunities – and draw investments away 
from competing industries. The increased investment will spur additional production in eggs and 
cheese, and production will be reduced in competing industries for which demand is less urgent and 
from which investment was withdrawn. But if the government artificially limits profits, this process 
will be frustrated according to the extent of the intervention. Profit controls serve like a perverse 
warning sign to the entrepreneur and investor. In the absence of controls, he had looked upon all 
investment opportunities on an equal basis, focusing on the items which people demonstrated were 
most important to them, so as to maximize his own returns by serving the customers to their own 
satisfaction. But now, with price controls and profit limitations, he will tend to avoid these options. 
There will be economic perversity as a consequence. Whereas in a free-market, resources flowed away 
from industries producing less urgently-required resources and towards industries producing essentials, 
once price-controls are imposed on essentials, the very opposite will occur. Resources will flow away 
from industries producing necessities, where they are most needed, and towards luxuries, where they 
are not. Given the presumed goal of the Rabbis, the mandate to impose regulation on necessities and to 
allow freedom for luxuries is the very opposite of what will best serve the community. Given the 
Rabbis' goals, then if we have to have government interference in the economy, it would be far better to 
control extravagant items and to leave essentials strictly alone. Were price-controls to be imposed on 
luxuries and a free-market allowed in essentials, then investment would flow away from luxuries and 
towards essentials, and the goals of the Rabbis would be better accomplished.
One might object that all this is true only in the long-term, when production can adjust to new 
prices. Perhaps in the short-term, price-controls are actually beneficial for assisting the poor weather 
the adverse conditions. In the short-term, supply is relatively fixed – the supply curve is a vertical line – 
and so supply cannot adjust to prices anyway. However, price-controls are self-defeating in the short-
term as well, due to their effect on demand. Whereas the quantity supplied will increase in the long-
term in response to an increase in price, it is equally true that quantity demanded will decrease in the 
short-term in response to that same increase in price. In other words, prices serve to ration scarce 
supplies in the short-term by modulating demand. For example, suppose a famine has struck and there 
is only a small quantity of grain left. If the price is allowed to remain at its customary level, then 
consumers will continue to consume the same quantity of grain as they have before, unless strict 
rationing measures are imposed, such as establishing quotas or requiring rationing coupons in addition 
to money. But if the price of grain is allowed to rise in response to the shortage induced by the famine, 
then consumers will consume less grain in the short-term, stretching out the limited supply over a 
longer period until enough time has passed that supply can increase in response to the higher price. 
Therefore, not only are price-controls disastrous for their effect in reducing quantity supplied, but they 
cause equal damage in increasing quantity demanded, compared to the lesser quantity which would be 
demanded if the price were allowed to increase. Price-controls established in times of privation and 
famine thus serve to harm the very people they are intended to help in not one but two ways, like 
Marshall's analogy of the two blades of a scissors coming from opposite sides: when supplies are short, 
price-controls reduce the quantity supplied and increase the quantity demanded relative to what they 
would be in a free-market, thus making the famine or disaster doubly insufferable. The consequences of 
price-controls, therefore, are never what they aim to be, but instead, they produce queues (Coyne and 
Coyne 2015b: 19), black markets (Coyne and Coyne 2015b: 20), and product quality deterioration 
(Coyne and Coyne 2015b: 20). Price-controls even promote discrimination (Coyne and Coyne 2015b: 
20, Levine 2012: 193). Ordinarily, a person can indulge in their racist or sexist – or otherwise 
discriminatory – preferences only by suffering a reduction to their profits. For example, if markets are 
clearing and supply equals demand, a person cannot refuse to sell to blacks unless they are willing to 
lose a substantial portion of their customer base. In fact, railroad firms lobbied against Jim Crow for 
precisely this reason (Gorman 2008 quoting Roback 1986). But when minimum prices cause demand to 
exceed supply, discriminators can afford to indulge their preferences. If there are already more 
customers than there are supplies to sell them, then the seller loses little by deciding to sell only to 
whites. Thus, price-controls have several negative consequences aside from their simple promotion of 
surpluses and shortages.
For these reasons, one must reject the economic logic underlying the moral values expressed in 
Aaron Levine's statement that (1985a: 424):
Raising price on the basis of an upward shift of the demand curve is regarded in Jewish 
law as unethical when the shift is rooted in a changed circumstance, e.g. war, which 
makes the consumer's need for the product desperate. Similarly unethical is the raising 
of a price when the shift is due to an artificially created need by dint of religious law.
First, Levine has confused a rightward (or upward) shift of the demand curve with a leftward (or 
upward) shift of the supply curve. Warfare does not increase demand but rather it decreases supply. It is 
not that people wish to eat more food in wartime than they used to consume in peacetime; it is rather 
that war makes food harder to come by at any given price. Invading armies of the time lacked supply 
lines, and they sustained themselves from the fields. They may have also burned whatever they could 
consume themselves. Therefore, the supply of all crops at a given price would have shifted left. Now, it 
is true that demand will shift right as consumers speculatively anticipate a future rise in prices due to 
the supply shock. In other words, consumers will be willing to spend more for a given quantity of food 
in the present because they anticipate that prices will rise in the future because of the war. But this 
rightward shift in demand is in response to the anticipated leftward shift in supply. Therefore, the 
principal effect of warfare is a leftward supply shock, and the rightward shift in demand is merely a 
secondary response to that supply shock. Levine has somehow neglected the primary shift in supply 
and focused on the secondary shift in demand. In any case, however, Levine has failed to realize that a 
price-control in this situation will be self-defeating and harm the very people it is meant to help. The 
economist qua economist cannot pass judgment on normative, ethical values, but it is his sworn duty to 
highlight when the means are inappropriate to the end. Here, when warfare has caused a decrease in the 
supply of essential goods, prices must be allowed to increase for two reasons: first, to call forth an 
increase in supply, and second, to reduce quantity demanded and allocate the limited supply that 
remains. If, on the contrary, a price-control is imposed, then there will be no incentive for suppliers to 
alleviate the privation and consumers will consume too much and fail to economize the limited supply. 
As an economist, Aaron Levine cannot dispute the ethical claim made by Judaism. But as an 
economist, he should have argued that the Jewish insistence on a price-control in these situations would 
harm the very people meant to be helped. The economist must always be value-free and never question 
a normative value, but as a positive scientist, his task is to show when the means chosen will fail to 
accomplish the given normative end. Judaism is entitled to demand a price-control in these situations, 
but it must realize that it will be defeating itself and frustrating the accomplishment of its (Judaism's) 
own desires. Levine (1985b: 447) is completely wrong to argue that a price-control in a situation of 
scarcity or shortage “would not really impose much of a problem in terms of resource allocation.” 
Similarly, the positive economist cannot agree with Meir Tamari's assertion that trade restrictions are 
legitimate where the merchant is “earning excessive profits or where there is no benefit to the 
consumer” (Tamari 1991: 69). Because all prices communicate essential information (Hayek 1945) and 
because price-signals alone efficiently promote economic coordination, there is, in general, no 
scientific way to declare that a profit is excessive or detrimental to the consumer. Profit-and-loss 
signals provide feedback which is essential to the healthy and effective operation of the market process 
(Coyne and Coyne 2015b: 9-12).
V. Restrictions Against Middlemen and Speculators
Given these negative effects of price-controls, it is profoundly unfortunate that Talmudic 
economic regulations were applied against speculators and middlemen as well (Hil. Mekhira 14: 4-8; 
Warhaftig 1987 passim; Tamari 1987: 88-90, 1986: 406; Kleiman 1987: 35f.), whom economic science 
today recognizes as performing indispensably valuable roles when they are allowed to act freely. 
According to Menachem Elon (2008),
Particular care was taken to maintain a cheap supply of essential products in Ereẓ Israel 
[i.e. the Land of Israel], where no middleman between producer and consumer was 
tolerated: “It is forbidden to speculate in essential commodities in Ereẓ Israel but 
everyone shall bring from his barn and sell so that these [commodities] may be sold 
cheaply” (Tosef. Av. Zar. 4:1; BB 91a, Yad, Mekhirah 14:4; Sh. Ar. ḤM 231:23); however, 
it was decided that in the case of a commodity in free supply or where a middleman 
worked to prepare and process the product, such as baking bread from wheat, profit-
making was permitted, even in Ereẓ Israel (Tosef. Av. Zar. 4:1; BB 91a and Rashbam, 
Yad Ramah and Beit ha-Behirah ibid.; Yad, Mekhirah 14:4; Sh. Ar., ḤM 231:23). The 
sages sought in various ways to eliminate the factors which made for a climate for 
profiteering. Thus it was forbidden to hoard produce bought on the market, lest this 
cause prices to rise and bring losses to the poor, and in a year of famine no hoarding at 
all was permitted (not as much as a “cab of carobs”), not even of the produce harvested 
from one's own field (BB 90b; Yad, Mekhirah 14:5–7).
Similarly Isidore Epstein (1985: iv):47
For the same reason [viz. 'safeguarding the standards of life of the consumer'] provision 
was made cutting out the middleman’s profit in the case of eggs ... The prohibition 
applies apparently to all foodstuffs.
Likewise Meyer S. Lew (1985: 185):48
Wholesalers of foods were only to have a small profit while retailers were allowed a 
larger margin. Similarly, the Talmud forbids agencies or middlemen to deal in articles of 
food. The farmer was to sell direct to the consumer.
Finally, Meir Tamari (1991: 69):49
This would place the halakhah in favor of direct producer-consumer marketing 
arrangements in agricultural produce, which negate the profits of the middlemen. … 
Essential goods may not be bought up by speculators hoping to resell them in times of 
scarcity.
Furthermore, Meir Tamari links the profit-limitation of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh (which applies 
only to essential foodstuffs) with the restrictions on middlemen, saying (Tamari 1991: 68; cf. Tamari 
1987: 89) that there are 
a number of Talmudic statements that disapprove of profits earned in the trade of basic 
goods essential to the individual's welfare, and sometimes even the trade itself.
These enactments and injunctions betray a fundamental misunderstanding of the economic roles 
of middlemen and of hoarders and speculators. When a speculator buys up a large quantity of the 
supply today, it can only be to sell it sometime in the future. The speculator does not plan on 
consuming everything himself; he can profit only by eventually relinquishing his hoard. Nothing is 
being destroyed or disposed of; everything the speculator purchases, he purchases to sell again. 
Therefore, we must ask why he does this. The answer is that the speculator, in buying when prices are 
low and selling when prices are high, is in fact doing nothing other than buying when supplies are 
plentiful and selling when supplies are scarce. By doing so, he evens out the fluctuations in the long-
term; he prevents prices from rising in times of privation as much as they would have risen without 
him. By buying when prices are low, he reduces the supply at a time when the supply is plentiful, and 
by selling when prices are high, he increases supply at the time when supply is scarce. For example, 
suppose that today there is a supply of one million lbs. of wheat at a price of $1/lb. And suppose the 
speculator believes that a famine is coming, and that next year, there will be only 100,000 lbs. of wheat 
at a price of $10/lb. So he purchases 300,000 lbs. of wheat today, driving up the price to perhaps $3/lb. 
today. But next year, when the famine arrives and the price of wheat rises to $10/lb. because there is 
only 100,000 lbs. available, he releases his hoard of 300,000 lbs. onto the market, increasing the supply 
from 100,000 lbs. to 400,000 lbs. of wheat, and decreasing the price from $10/lb. to say $6/lb. Without 
the speculator, there would have been a fluctuation from year to year, from one million pounds at $1/lb. 
in the present to only 100,000 lbs. at $10/lb. the next year. But the speculator evened out the fluctuation 
so that there was 700,000 lbs. at $3/lb. now and 400,000 lbs. at $6/lb in a year. The speculator reduces 
the supply and increases the price at a time of plenitude and decreases the price and increases the 
supply in the future, at a time of famine. Yes, the speculator does profit: he spent say $300,000 
(300,000 lbs. at $1/lb.) and earned back $3 million (300,000 lbs. at $10/lb.), making a profit of 
$2,700,000 (also minus the interest foregone). But what a service he has done to the community, saving 
them from famine! His profit is nothing other than the signal and symbol of how much good he has 
performed for others (cf. Holcombe 2014: 394f., s.v. “Where do dissipated transitional profits go?”). 
Therefore, when the halakhah punishes speculation and hoarding, this does nothing other than to 
potentially condemn the innocent to privation or even starvation. The speculator does almost exactly 
what Joseph did in the famous Biblical story, when he foresaw through prophecy the coming lean years 
and stored up grain in the royal granaries – and yet whereas the Bible upholds Joseph as a hero, the 
halakhah condemns the non-prophetic speculator as a villain.
The animus against middlemen is similarly ill-conceived.50 It might be thought that middlemen 
do nothing but tack on a profit without doing anything productive. According to Itamar Warhaftig 
(1987: sec. “3”), “One of the contributory causes of high prices is excessive intermediary trading as 
every additional middleman adds to the final price.” However, this is the opposite of the truth. 
Warhaftig adds (1987: sec. “C”) that “It is well known that the prices of fruits and vegetables are 
elevated by unnecessary intermediate trading.” Maybe this is well-known, but it was also well-known 
in antiquity that the sun revolves around the earth and that illnesses are caused by an excess of humors. 
Similarly, Meir Tamari says (1986: 406), “the sages of the Talmud saw the increased costs caused by 
middlemen as detrimental the poor and weaker classes.” But as Walter E. Block said to Tamari (Block 
1986: 440), “If so, then the sages were seeing something that simply is not true.” The only way that a 
middleman can attract business is by offering either a lower price or greater ease and convenience. 
Suppose wholesaler A is selling to customer B. Retailer (middleman) C can break into this chain and 
insert himself as an intermediary only by offering terms that are simultaneously better to both A and to 
B. Wholesaler A will not sell to retailer C and customer B will not buy from retailer C unless A and B 
both benefit from permitting C to intervene in the middle of the chain. The retailer frees the customer 
from the burden of having to deal with a separate wholesaler for every one of the hundreds of different 
goods he purchases. Meanwhile, the retailer frees the wholesaler to concentrate on his specific area of 
comparative advantage - viz. production – instead of areas where the wholesaler is less competent. If 
this were not so, if the consumer and wholesaler could both save money, time, and effort by dealing 
directly with each other, then neither would bother to interact with the retailer or middleman. Thus, the 
middleman does not increase costs, but on the contrary, he decreases them. As the colonial American 
Reverend John Witherspoon (one of the teachers of James Madison) observed in 1786 (McDurmon 
2010: 56f), the authors of legislation restricting middlemen
considered that every hand through which a commodity passed must have a profit upon 
it, which would therefore greatly augment the cost to the consumer at last. But could 
anything in the world be more absurd? … [I]t may be safely affirmed that the more 
merchants, the cheaper [the] goods, and that no carriage is so cheap, nor any distribution 
so equal or so plentiful, as that which is made by those who have an interest in it and 
expect a profit from it.
Furthermore, transportation does nothing less than to fundamentally transform a good from one 
good into another. An apple in New York City is not the same good as an apple in New Orleans. If the 
two goods were identical, then the inhabitant of New Orleans would be indifferent between them. But 
since the inhabitant of New Orleans definitely prefers apples in New Orleans to apples in New York, 
this demonstrates that the two goods are not the same. Transporting an apple from one place to another 
performs an economic transformation of its utility every bit as real as the man who prunes the apple 
tree. The processes of growing apples and transporting them are physically distinct, but economically 
speaking, they both transform goods from one kind to another and create utility or value where there 
was none before. As Thomas Sowell notes (1975: 68f.)
If the same physical thing is assumed to have the same value without regard to space or 
time, then the middleman is simply cheating people. … In reality, they [the producer and 
consumer] deal through the middleman because he is changing the value of things by 
relocating them, holding them to times that are more convenient, assuming various risks 
by stocking inventories – and doing so at less cost than either the producer or consumer 
could. … In short, middlemen can continue to exist only insofar as they can perform 
certain functions more cheaply than either the producer or consumer. But no matter how 
varied and complex these functions may be, they amount ultimately to relocating things 
in time and space, and the physical fallacy which denies value to that operation 
necessarily indicts middlemen as mere cheaters.51
According to Warhaftig (1987: sec. “3”), these restrictions on middlemen no longer apply in a 
modern economy. In his words, 
It is possible that in a modern economy, it is no longer true that the owner can sell to the 
public without effort, and therefore he is permitted to sell through a middleman. Since 
the middleman is expending effort to make the product available throughout the sales 
network, he is also entitled to a profit.
However, this was equally true in the time of the Talmud. It has always been true that middlemen 
expend effort. And it has never been the case that farmers could sell to the public without effort. On the 
contrary, if farmers had ever been able to sell to the public with less effort than the middlemen, then the 
middleman would not have come into existence. It was precisely because the middleman's opportunity 
costs were less that he was able to charge lower prices than the farmer would have been able to. If it 
took less effort – measured by individual subjective opportunity cost – for a farmer to sell his produce 
than it took a middleman, then a farmer would be able to undercut the middleman's prices. The fact that 
middlemen exist proves that they lower prices and incur a smaller opportunity cost. Nevertheless, we 
thank Warhaftig for arguing that the Talmud's restrictions on middlemen no longer apply, even if his 
reason was equally true when the Talmud was written.
Meanwhile, Keith Sharfman (2006) has attempted to defend the Talmudic regulations against 
speculation using Martin Weitzman's “shortage syndrome” model. Following Weitzman, Sharfman 
argues that speculation is inefficient “when a market is not clearing for some reason, such as when 
there is a state-mandated price ceiling on the relevant commodity” (Sharfman 2006: 190). When prices 
are below market-clearing and quantity demanded exceeds quantity supplied, then queues will develop 
and the first consumers in the queue will hoard more than is efficient given the “true” equilibrium 
price. According to Sharfman (2006: 190),
The most obvious policy solution to the shortage/hoarding phenomenon is to allow 
prices to rise. But this may be politically untenable in some circumstances. An 
alternative, second best solution is to initiate some kind of anti-hoarding policy.
At this point, Sharfman (2006: 191) introduces the “sixteen percent rule” and argues that it “has many 
of the same characteristics as the price controls contemplated in the Weitzman model.”52 Sharfman 
leaves it as an open question “whether the sixteen percent rule makes good policy sense” (2006: 191), 
but says that “we may take the rule as a given constraint” (2006: 191). Taking the “sixteen percent rule” 
as a given, Sharfman speculates that the Talmudic restrictions on speculation are an effective response 
to inefficient hoarding and queuing caused by the imposition of price-controls (2006: 191). But a few 
complications are worth noticing: first, Sharfman argues that what is problematic is not professional 
speculation but rather consumer hoarding (2006: 183, 184, 187, 190). By contrast, the tenor of the 
treatments by most other authors suggests the Talmud was more concerned with professional 
speculators. For example, Warhaftig speaks (1987: sec. “2”) of “when a merchant withholds a product 
until a shortage develops in order to cause a price rise” and he adds (1987: sec. “C”) that “[t]he 
prohibition applies to the merchant and to the consumer” alike. Second, Sharfman's defense does not 
account for the Talmud's criticism of middlemen. But most importantly of all, what Sharfman's analysis 
really proves is not that speculation ought to be restricted, but that the price-control of hafka'at 
she'arim / hayyei nefesh ought to be abolished. If price-controls cause queues, hoarding, and shortages, 
then the most reasonable response is to repeal price-controls. Thus, Sharfman's argument actually 
reinforces our own, that the prohibition of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh is undesirable and 
inefficient. It may be that it is political inexpedient to repeal the price-control, but that is a tragedy 
deserving only lament.
VI. Economic Intervention: A Self-Defeating Morality
Therefore, price-control legislation will do little to help the poor and suffering, and will in fact 
do much to make their straits even worse. And yet according to Isidore Epstein, all these economic 
regulations have an ethical basis, for he prefaces a discussion of Talmudic economic legislation by 
stating (1962: i),
morality was made the dominating factor of communal life, and the underlying principle 
of all legislation regulating social and economic relations.
Similarly, according to Menachem Elon (2008),53
Certain authorities even regard the prohibition [of ona'ah specifically] as being 
religiously based, unrelated to civil law (Rabbenu Hanannel, BM 51b; Asheri, BM 4:7), 
indicating that this law originated from the ethical imperative of conducting business 
fairly and amicably, based on the verse “that your brother may live with you” (Lev. 
25:36).
As Elon shows, this is not the universal view, but it lends support to the suggestion that the laws 
prohibiting ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim were enacted with an intention towards justice and fairness. 
Warren Goldstein also interprets these laws as having an ethical basis, and he explicitly 
specifies that the goal is to improve the welfare and quality-of-life of the poor. In a work dedicated to 
demonstrating how Jewish law aimed at “defending the human spirit from abuse by the powerful” 
(2006: 1), Goldstein states (2006: 447),54
Jewish law ... intervenes to help the poor. For example, price controls are imposed on 
essential goods to make them affordable to the poor. Such an intervention benefits 
people ... The poor can thus benefit, together with others.
Similarly, in a “volume ... show[ing] that justice, equity and humanity are central to the halakhah” 
(Lew 1985: ix), Dayan (rabbinical judge) Meyer S. Lew argues (1985: 5),
That justice and compassion motivated the many rabbinical and communal enactments 
and ordinances adopted and applied by the religious and lay leaders through the ages is 
further proof of a deep concern for the weal of the community, the welfare of the family 
and the rights and freedoms of the individual.
Moreover, according to Lew, not only were the “rabbinical and communal enactments and ordinances” 
in general meant to further “the weal of the community”, but price-controls specifically were intended 
to improve the quality-of-life of the poor (Lew 1985: 184f.):55
The Rabbis regarded the raising of prices above their actual value as a serious threat to 
the economic welfare of the public. … It is obvious that these rules were designed to 
control prices which would otherwise be higher and bear harshly upon the poor. … In 
any event care was taken to prevent unscrupulous merchants from taking advantage of 
the poor.
Similarly, Isidore Epstein states (1962: iv),
the prices were fixed not at individual discretion, but were corporately determined with 
a view to safeguarding the standards of life of the consumers.
Likewise, Itamar Warhaftig concludes (1987: sec. “C. Summation and Application”),
there exists a measure of intervention and supervision designed to ensure that the lower 
economic classes will be able to purchase essential items at affordable prices.
According to Meir Tamari (1987: 91), “The basic concern behind these injunctions … was the welfare 
of the average consumer.” And finally, Aaron Levine states that according to Rabbi Joshua ben 
Alexander ha-Kohen Falk (Semah), the purpose of these laws is “to allow consumers to achieve 
subsistence without undue hardship” (Levine 2012: 93). 
These scholars all argue that the Talmudic economic regulations are not intended as a purely 
moral (deontological) measure, but they specify a consequentialist aim.56 The price-controls are 
imposed, not because they are inherently just and righteous and fair regardless of consequences, but 
quite to the contrary, these laws were created in order to improve the lives of the poor in a practical, 
consequentialist sense. How tragic then, that in all likelihood, these laws would have the exact opposite 
consequence, and tend to make life worse for nearly everybody. In other words, these laws would tend 
to be self-defeating, accomplishing the very opposite of their intentions. Therefore, our present 
criticism of Talmudic economic regulations is not based on a foreign, non-Jewish ethical standard. 
Instead, these halakhot are ineffective at accomplishing a specifically Jewish end. We are not rejecting 
the ethical end of Judaism in favor of some other religion or philosophy, but rather, we are criticizing 
Jewish authorities for having selected a means that is inappropriate for their specifically Jewish end (cf. 
Milton Friedman 1985: 408; Block and Hexham 1986: 451, 455f.).
Furthermore, if the Talmudic economic regulations would tend to make miserable the lives on 
innocent human beings, we might justifiably ask, what can be the worthiness of an ethic which makes 
life almost universally less enjoyable? Surely material quality-of-life itself has some ethical value. After 
all, the prophet did declare, “the L-rd that created the heavens, He is G-d; that formed the earth and 
made it, He established it, He created it not a waste, He formed it to be inhabited” (Isaiah 45:18). 
Moreover, there is evidence that the Talmudic legislation was definitely intended – at least partially – to 
promote material welfare: for when the price of sacrificial doves increased, Rabbi Simeon ben Gamliel 
famously taught that women who were previously obligated to bring five sacrifices henceforth needed 
to bring only one.57 Similarly, the rabbi Samuel threatened to change his opinion and teach more 
leniently that certain utensils were kosher after the Passover and that certain myrtles were kosher for 
the lulav on Sukkot (Feast of Tabernacles) unless the merchants selling those items would lower their 
prices.58 All this suggests that consequentialist considerations played at least some role in the 
establishment of the Talmud's social legislation. Apparently the Talmud did not have a purely 
consequences-indifferent, “come hell or high water” deontological notion of justice and morality. And 
so without committing ourselves  to full-blown consequentialism, it nevertheless appears that a 
business or social ethic which produces almost exclusively negative practical consequences must at 
least be doubtful, and should be faced with skepticism. According to Roderick T. Long (2002),
Whatever they may say officially, most consequentialists would be deeply disturbed to 
discover that their favoured policies slighted human dignity, and most deontologists 
would be deeply disturbed to discover that their favoured policies had disastrous 
consequences.
Long adds (2012),
one of the advantages of the eudaimonistic approach, as I understand it, is that it avoids 
both the excessive consequence-sensitivity of utilitarianism and the excessive 
consequence-insensitivity of deontology.
Furthermore, Long states (2013),
the fact that all but the hardiest deontologists generally try to show that their favoured 
policies will in fact have good consequences, while all but the hardiest consequentialists 
generally try to show that they’re not committed to morally outrageous conclusions, 
suggests that most professed deontologists and consequentialists are actually, to their 
credit, crypto-eudaimonists. 
Therefore, if the laws in question – viz. hafka'at she'arim, regulations against middlemen and 
speculation, and communal imposition of wage and price controls – would tend to produce almost 
universally and exclusively negative consequences, we should at least be skeptical of how moral or just 
those laws can really be. These laws could perhaps turn out to be an example of what Derek Parfit 
called a “self-defeating morality” (1979: 533):
There are certain things we ought to try to achieve. Call these our moral aims. Our moral 
theory would be self-defeating if we believed we ought to do what will cause our moral 
aims to be worse achieved.
According to Parfit, a moral theory is “formally self-defeating” when a moral theory that is an end unto 
itself irrespective of the consequences, fails to be accomplished. He does not reference Kantian 
deontology, but that appears to be something like what he means by a moral theory that is an end unto 
itself. Such a moral theory is formally self-defeating when it fails to be executed. By contrast, a moral 
theory is “substantively self-defeating” when the moral theory intends certain “substantive aims” or 
consequences which fail to be accomplished by the performance of the stipulated causal action.59 
Parfit's examples all fall into the categories of prisoner's dilemmas and public goods, where private and 
social costs and benefits diverge. In these cases, a moral theory which specifies one ought to take action 
for one's own personal benefit (or for one's own family) will produce worse consequences not only for 
others but even for oneself, compared to if one had violated the moral theory and instead acted for 
others (or for others' families). In such cases, Parfit says, the self-interested moral theory is “self-
defeating.” In other words, if a moral theory specifies some aim to be accomplished, then that 
accomplishment must somehow matter at least to some degree, and the moral theory is self-defeating if 
that aim fails to be accomplished by the performance of the stipulated action. The halakhah's economic 
regulations appear to fall into this category; they intend lofty and admirable moral aims, but their 
enforcement would tend to produce consequences the very opposite of what they intended.
VII. Aaron Levine's Interpretation of the Essential Foodstuffs Profit-limitation
But Aaron Levine's interpretation of the profit-limitation (hafka'at she'arim) ordinance 
concerning essential foodstuffs (hayyei nefesh) is unique and requires its own treatment.60 Levine notes 
from the outset of his analysis that price-controls are self-defeating (Levine 2012: 22, 93-95, 110). He 
recognizes that prices serve as signals (Levine 2012: 93) directing the allocation of resources (Levine 
2012: 94), and that profits serve the same function as well (Levine 2012: 94). Price-controls will 
generally result in shortages, black markets, and the necessity for rationing (Levine 2012: 94). 
Furthermore, price-controls discourage new entry by alternate suppliers (Levine 2012: 94). Therefore, 
he attempts to show that the profit-limitation of hafka'at she'arim is not a price-control at all. In 
Levine's interpretation (2012: 106), “the rabbis set the price ceiling above the equilibrium price” (cf. 
Levine 2012: 107, 110, 111). But the price ceiling is not the price which the rabbis enforce. As Levine 
says (2012: 107, 111),61 “Because the price ceiling is a matter of public knowledge, some may, 
however, erroneously regard it as a mandated price.” In fact, it is not the rabbinic price ceiling but 
rather the equilibrium market price which constitutes the mandated price which binds sellers. “It is the 
role of these supervisors to survey the marketplace and make sure that no one sells above the 
competitive norm” (Levine 2012: 107; cf. 2012: 111). If the sellers are bound, not by the rabbinic price 
ceiling but rather by the competitive market price, then what function does the rabbinic price ceiling 
serve? Levine answers that “the usefulness of setting a price ceiling is that it signals the rabbis when 
remedial measures should be put in place … [including] a rationing system” (Levine 2012: 107, 111),62 
to be implemented after the market price has increased such that “the price ceiling becomes the 
competitive norm” (Levine 2012: 107, 111).63 In other words, sellers are bound by the competitive 
market price itself, and the price commissioners of the court enforce the market price, not the price 
ceiling. The function of the price ceiling is only to serve as a signal; once the market price increases to 
the point that it equals or exceeds the price ceiling, then further interventions become warranted, 
including non-price rationing (cf. Levine 1985a: 423). For Levine, the market price is to be allowed to 
freely fluctuate, but if supply shocks (Levine 2012: 107) cause the competitive market rate to increase 
until it reaches the official price ceiling, this will serve as a signal for the beit din (rabbinical court) to 
institute non-market rationing schemes. Furthermore, this mechanism is to be coupled with the 
communal institution of wage and price controls (Levine 2012: 108, 111), which may conflict with and 
supersede the hayyei nefesh ordinance (Levine 2012: 108). The purpose of these controls is to eliminate 
economic rents and profits (1985a: 423; 1985b: 448f.; 2012: 109, 112).
But there are a few problems with Levine's interpretation: first, in Levine's interpretation, there 
is still a system of price-controls, only the price which is enforced is not the official price declared by 
the beit din, but rather the supposed competitive market rate. In other words, there is a sort of 
terminological dispute about what to call the price that is enforced, but there is still some price that is 
enforced. The entire purpose of Levine's interpretation was to deny that the Talmud imposed price-
controls, for he admitted that price-controls are self-defeating (Levine 2012: 22, 93-95, 110). But after 
all his efforts, his interpretation still results in there being a price-control, only the price that is enforced 
is not the official price promulgated by the courts, but rather the price which the courts perceive to be 
the market price. Either way, a price-control is still being enforced. A price-control is still a price-
control regardless of whether the price that is enforced is an officially promulgated price or whether it 
is the preexisting status quo market price from which future deviations are prohibited. If deviations 
from the status quo market price are prohibited, then this still constitutes a price-control with all its 
attendant negative effects. If the equilibrium market-clearing price changes but the status quo market 
price continues to be enforced, then the market will be unable to clear, and there will be economic 
misallocations and dislocations. Furthermore, in his interpretation, once the market price rises to equal 
the official price, at that point, the court is supposed to institute non-price-rationing, which means there 
is still a price-control. Furthermore, Levine says that all this is to be coupled with communal wage and 
price controls. So all Levine has done is to replace one form of price-control with another.
Second, it is difficult to understand how the market price could ever rise to meet the official 
price-ceiling if the commissioners punish every deviation from the market price. How are prices to rise 
if sellers are bound by the status quo market prices?64 As we noted, enforcement of the status quo 
market price is still a price-control. Suppose the market price is today $10 and the official price-ceiling 
is $20 (following Levine's interpretation that the two differ). When the market price rises to $20, 
Levine would say, this would serve as a signal to the court to take remedial action, including rationing 
(Levine 2012: 107).65 But how is the market price to rise from $10 to $20 if the first merchant to charge 
$12 (deviating more than one-sixth from $10) is immediately punished and forced to sell at $11 (within 
one-sixth)? If every significant deviation from the market price is immediately prevented, how will the 
market price ever change? Perhaps Levine assumes the price will change only gradually, from $10 to 
$11 to $12, etc., $1 at a time, until it finally reaches $20, instead of going straight from $10 to $20. 
Starting with a price of $10, then one may charge $11.67, i.e. 1/6 more than $10. Then, when $11.67 has 
become the new general price-level, one may charge 1/6 more than that, or $13.60. This process will 
continue until one finally reaches $20, the efficient market-clearing price which was desired all along. 
But if an increase from $10 to $20 is necessary to achieve market-clearing equilibrium, then the last 
thing we want is to delay that transition by forcing it to be gradual, compelling the price-transition to 
proceed by proportions of 1/6. The faster the transition is made, the less painful it will be and the fewer 
economic disruptions and dislocations it will cause. If the current market price is $10 and some alert 
entrepreneur realizes that the market will clear only at $20, then we want him to be able to immediately 
charge $20. We do not want him to have to first charge $11.67, then wait until all his competitors 
charge $11.67 too (so that $11.67 becomes the new market price), and then charge $13.60, etc., 
repeating this tedious process until $20. There appears to be no theoretical economic reason why such a 
gradual transition would be desirable.
Nor did Levine ever indicate that he had such a gradual transition in mind in his statement that 
the price-level would be permitted to change even as deviations from it were simultaneously 
prohibited. Instead, it appears more likely that Levine relied on a static-equilibrium conception of price 
theory, whereby the general market rate of prices changes according to the actions of a mythical 
Walrasian auctioneer without any individual market participant ever having changed his own prices. If 
every market participant is a price-taker rather than a price-setter, then no market participant can be 
responsible for changing the general price-level. But then who did change the price-level? Apparently, 
according to the static conception, the price changed itself without any human input. But according to 
theory of the market as a “process” (Kirzner 1997, following Mises), the general price-level can change 
only as a result of individual market participants changing their prices. The general price level will 
change from $10 to $20 when merchants individually change the prices they charge, in response to 
individually changing perceptions of relative supply and demand by different market participants.
If the Talmud assumed a static-equilibrium model of a general price-level that changes without 
any individual market participants changing their prices, then hafka'at she'arim would definitely be a 
price-control – contrary to Levine's interpretation – for the court commissioners would have to ban 
every deviation from the market price by individual merchants and thus prevent the price from ever 
changing. It is meaningless to allow the general price-level to change if every individual merchant is 
forbidden to alter the prices he charges. Levine's attempt to show that hafka'at she'arim is not a price-
control will have failed. At best, prices would be permitted to change only gradually, in the manner 
which we have indicated, from $10 to $11.67 to $13.60, but without passing directly from $10 to the 
market-clearing rate of $20. Interpreted in this way, hafka'at she'arim would not constitute a pure price-
control, but it would nevertheless put a brake on economic adjustments and unnecessarily prolong the 
agony of economic disequilibrium. But if the Talmud understood the market as a “process,” as with 
Mises and Kirzner, then the Talmud would have understood that the general price-level changes if and 
only if individual merchants change their prices. In that case, allowing the general price-level to change 
necessarily presumes that merchants have full freedom to charge whatever prices they wish. Therefore, 
the Talmud could not have intended what Levine argues it did, namely that the commissioners were to 
ban individual merchants from deviating from the market price at the same time that the general price-
level was to be allowed to somehow fluctuate until it reached the official price. Either the Talmud 
assumed that the market is a dynamic process, and Levine's interpretation of the Talmud is untenable; 
or else the Talmud assumed static-equilibrium, and hafka'at she'arim is indeed a price-control, contrary 
to Levine's intended aim. Or it is possible that the purpose of the law was to prolong economic 
adjustment by forcing price changes to be unnecessarily gradual and step-wise, in which case Levine 
has failed once again to prove hafka'at she'arim is not a price-control.
Interestingly, Levine assumes that the law of hafka'at she'arim as recorded in the codes of 
Jewish law no longer applies, but he never specifies the legal mechanism by which this law has been 
annulled. He states (2012: 109, 112):66
What survives is not the 20% figure per se. This figure made sense only for the 
marketplace and economic conditions that existed at the time of the enactment of the 
ordinance. The general objection to “excessive profits” for those who deal in essential 
products should, however, remain. What should be substituted for the 20% figure today 
is the notion that the ideal is to craft government tax and regulatory policy to eliminate 
economic rents in the hayyei nefesh [essential foodstuffs] sector. In other words, the goal 
should be to prevent profits in this sector from exceeding opportunity cost earnings.67
Unfortunately, Levine's scheme of taxing profits above opportunity costs to eliminate rents is not any 
better than the original price-control which he sought to avoid. As we showed earlier, profits and losses 
are essential signals to investors and producers. Profits motivate new entry while losses inspire exit. 
Taxing excess profits would therefore deter new entry, as Levine himself says (2012: 94). For example, 
if a famine has struck a land and the price of food has skyrocketed, the excess profits will encourage 
foreign suppliers to divert their food supply from their own domestic market where profits are normal, 
to the famine-stricken market where profits are excess. If suppliers are forbidden to earn higher profits 
in the famine-stricken market than in their own local market, then they will have no incentive to export 
supplies to alleviate the famine. Levine's scheme of taxing excess profits would thus disrupt the price-
mechanism and create disorder in the market, just like any other price-control. Levine's error is 
especially puzzling because he himself correctly pointed out how essential profits are for coordination 
and signaling (Levine 2012: 94) and that price-controls are therefore self-defeating (Levine 2012: 110). 
Hence, it is not clear why Levine considers it desirable to eliminate profits. Perhaps it is because in 
Neoclassical static-equilibrium analysis, “above-normal profit is taken as an indicator of monopoly, and 
evidence of an inefficient allocation of resources” (Holcombe 2014: 388; cf. DiLorenzo 1988: 321f. 
and Pasour 1987: 124-126). But if so, then as Randall G. Holcombe has recently pointed out (2014: 
390, 400), 
profit is a sign of increased efficiency in the allocation of resources, not a sign of 
inefficiency. Consider this even within a comparative static framework. If one starts 
with the situation in which all markets are in equilibrium and there are no economic 
profits, and then an entrepreneur introduces an innovation into the market that generates 
economic profits, that profit will be the result of either an innovation that lowers the cost 
of production of the entrepreneur’s output, or produces a good or service that purchasers 
value more than the alternatives previously available. Either way, the profit is an 
indication that resources are being allocated more efficiently than before, and welfare 
has increased. . . . Above-normal profits indicate a welfare loss within a static 
framework, because using competitive equilibrium as a benchmark for efficiency, the 
firm making above-normal profit is doing so by producing an inefficiently low quantity 
to maintain that profit. However, when profit is the result of innovation, a competitive 
industry is the wrong benchmark, because the output would not have been produced 
were it not for the lure of future profit. 
In general, profits are a signal and an incentive for entrepreneurs to cut costs and introduce innovations 
which will benefit consumers (Holcombe 2014, Coyne and Coyne 2015b: 9-12.). Therefore, 
eliminating profits will remove the incentive for innovation and cost-cutting. Furthermore, Holcombe 
(2014: 389) asks us to
Consider the factors that actually have led to an increase in welfare in the context of 
neoclassical welfare economics. Would anyone argue that the reason people are better 
off today than they were a century ago, or two decades ago, is because the economy is 
closer to a Pareto optimal allocation of resources now? Welfare has increased because of 
economic progress, and the Pareto optimal allocation of resources that lies at the 
foundation of welfare economics is almost irrelevant to the factors that have actually led 
to increases in welfare. The static efficiency of Pareto optimality has little relationship to 
actual economic welfare, and its corollary that welfare maximization requires the 
economic profit be eliminated has very little relevance to actual economic welfare. 
Actual improvements in welfare are the result of economic progress, not moving closer 
to a Pareto optimal allocation of resources. 
Therefore, it is not clear why we would want to eliminate economic rents and tax excess profits, as 
Levine counsels us. Perhaps what Levine meant is that excess profits should be taxed only in the case 
of monopoly (cf. Levine 2012: 95) but not in the case of above-normal returns for successful 
entrepreneurship and innovation. If so, then this would bring us into the field of the theory of 
monopoly, which is beyond this article's scope.68 In any case, whereas Levine attempted to show that 
hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh does not constitute a price-control, nevertheless, every one of his 
interpretations ultimately reduces to some form of price-control or another.
VIII. A Few Remarks on Related Subjects
Now that we have completed our summary and analysis of the laws of ona'ah and hafka'at 
she'arim / hayyei nefesh as well as the restrictions on speculation and middlemen, let us make a few 
tangential remarks on some subjects which have sometimes arisen in connection with these laws. Since 
other authors have raised the following issues when discussing these laws, we should as well.
As we saw earlier, Menachem Elon argues that the prohibition of ona'ah is no longer legally 
binding because goods are too heterogeneous for there to be such a thing as the “true” price of a good. 
But Elon himself proceeds to belie his own words when he testifies – crucially, without objection or 
complaint – that the laws of ona'ah have in fact influenced civil law in the modern State of Israel (Elon 
2008; cf. Tamari 1987: 99):
In the State of Israel there are a number of laws designed to combat profiteering in 
essential commodities. The Commodities and Services (Control) Law, 5718 – 1957, 
provides for various means of supervision over commodities declared to be subject to 
control by the minister charged with implementation of the law, enforcible on pain of 
imprisonment, fine, and closing down of a business, etc. The Tenants' Protection Laws, 
5714 – 1954 and 5715 – 1955, control maximum rentals for residential and business 
premises and also limit the right of ejectment to grounds specified in these laws only. 
These laws are supplemented by the provisions of the Key Money Law, 5718 – 1958. 
The Restrictive Trade Practices Law, 5719 – 1959, restricts, among others, the artificial 
manipulation of price levels at the hands of a monopoly or cartel. In the Knesset debates 
preceding the passing of these laws, some members relied on Jewish law in support of 
their arguments (Divrei ha-Keneset vol. 7, p. 564; vol. 14, p. 1822; vol. 18, p. 2176; vol. 
21, p. 169; vols. 23, pp. 372, 374, 383; vol. 24, pp. 2478, 2514).
Elon fails to object that under Israeli law – unlike the halakhah – buyers and sellers cannot 
evade the price-controls by announcing the precise extent of the divergence. If ona'ah is meant only as 
a protection against asymmetric information, and if ona'ah is waived in the case of full-disclosure, then 
it cannot be used as a justification or basis for a conventional rent-control ordinance, which typically is 
binding even in the case of full-disclosure. It is strange that Elon thought it irrelevant that the halakhah 
of ona'ah – unlike Israeli law of rent-control – provides for a means by which to circumvent the law. 
Nor does Elon recall his earlier objection that ona'ah in general should not apply to a modern economy 
where goods are heterogeneous and prices disparate.
And since Elon mentioned the Tenants' Protection Law, a brief remark on rent-control may be 
warranted. The same analysis we gave previously concerning price-controls is equally applicable to 
rent-control (Block and Olsen 1985, Morton 2001: 52f., Rockoff 2008, Bourne 2015), including in 
Israel (Werczberger 1988, cited in Bourne 2015: 76). Well-intentioned politicians and government 
officials, concerned with housing shortages and high prices, especially for the poor, have enacted such 
legislation in order to improve matters. Instead, the very opposite has occurred. The controls serve as a 
warning device, alerting entrepreneurs of the dangers of any investment in housing. Landlords tend to 
neglect maintenance because rent is too low to pay for proper maintenance, and rental housing quality 
deteriorates. New construction of rental property tends to cease, and existing rental properties are 
converted into owner-occupied housing or into commercial and office space, which are not rent-
controlled. Even the fear of possible future rent controls can have these effects, thus, paradoxically, 
raising prices, and reducing vacancy rates. In contrast, luxury high-rise office towers, hotels, shopping 
centers and industrial parks have never been subjected to rent controls, and as a result, there are no 
shortages in these markets, and vacancy rates are oft-times in the double digit range. As Swedish 
economist Assar Lindbeck noted, “In many cases rent control appears to be the most effective 
technique presently known to destroy a city – except for bombing” (quoted in Bourne 2015: 73). Many 
of these effects exhibited themselves in Israel as well, where the imposition of rent-control led to a halt 
in construction of new rental housing (Werczberger 1988: 282) and neglect of maintenance 
(Werczberger 1988: 286). The damage caused by rent-control in Israel was mitigated by the exemption 
from rent-control of all properties built after 1953 (Werczberger 1988 passim), by the significant trend 
from rental to owner-occupied housing (Werczberger 1988 passim), and by the legalization of key 
money (security deposit) in 1958 (Werczberger 1988: 279). Key money allowed tenants and landlords 
to capitalize and internalize the benefits of rent-control (Werczberger 1988: 288), essentially converting 
the forgone rent into an alternative form not subject to rent-control. In other words, rent-control did 
relatively minimal damage only because it was effectively repealed and circumvented relatively 
quickly.
Meanwhile, we might note that the wages of workers are just another price, and as with all other 
forms of price-control, intervention in wage-rates will produce either shortages or surpluses 
(unemployment). For example, where minimum wages or mandatory union membership drive wages 
above the market-clearing rate, employers will reduce their demand for employees, producing 
permanent unemployment (Siebert 2015, Levine 2012: 191-193, 209). Ironically, then, the minimum 
wage hurts the very people it is meant to meant to help, producing self-defeating consequences (Levine 
2012: 191-193, 209). For this reason and others as well, Aaron Levine argues that Jewish law would 
reject any form of minimum wage (Levine 2012: 191-210). But as we saw earlier, the corporate 
community had the power to democratically regulate wages independent of the rabbinical court. Even 
though fixing wages would presumably have been intended to safeguard the workers' standard of life, 
their more likely consequence, if sufficiently enforced, would have been to create permanent 
unemployment. 
Aaron Levine, concluding that Jewish law cannot countenance the imposition of legislated 
minimum wages, argues that the community's power to regulate wages ought to be utilized instead to 
judge certain contracts as unconscionable – for example, a private employment contract stipulating that 
the employee is forbidden to seek additional employment on the side even though the employee's wage 
is insufficient to live on (Levine 2012: 202-204). Let us suppose for the sake of argument that such a 
contract nullification would have no negative effects. The problem is that Levine nowhere indicates 
what would constrain the democratic community to use its power only in such responsible ways. It is 
not enough to argue that the community ought to limit the exercise of its own power. Such a mere 
warning without institutional safeguards will turn out to be impotent. As Lord Acton famously declared 
(1887), “All power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Therefore, Thomas Jefferson 
declared (1798), “In questions of powers, then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind 
him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.” And as James Madison warned (1788), “In 
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: 
you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control 
itself.” Unfortunately, Levine does not indicate that there are any constitutional limitations on the 
democratic community's power to impose wage-controls. And voters tend not only to be rationally 
ignorant, but they often vote expressively based on what makes them feel good or what satisfies their 
consciences (Caplan 2007). It is not hard to imagine the electorate of the Jewish community voting to 
impose wage-floors, naively and idealistically believing that this will improve the welfare of the poor. 
But according to Levine, there seem to be no institutional safeguards against such abuse of democratic 
power. A robust political system cannot trust in blind faith that the right people will be in power. 
Robustness in political economy means ensuring tolerably good results even under adverse, sub-
optimal conditions (Pennington 2011). An unconstrained democratic power to impose wage and price-
controls fails to satisfy this criterion. Perhaps a corollary of Murphy's Law is in order: if power – even 
democratic power – can be abused, it will be.
IX. Are these Laws Still in Force?
We have now seen that while ona'ah is not a price-control, enforcement of hafka'at she'arim / 
hayyei nefesh and the restrictions on middlemen and speculation would be self-defeating like all price-
controls. Likewise, there is no doubt that the community's power to democratically impose wage and 
price controls would be economically self-defeating as well and produce unremittingly negative 
consequences.
The question is, what if anything can be done about these issues? As we already saw, the 
prohibition of ona'ah is no longer legally binding because there is no such thing as the “true” price of a 
good (Shilo and Elon 2008; Warhaftig 1988: sec. “G. Contemporary Application”, end of sec. “C. 
Exceptions”). Perhaps the same applies to the law of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh as well, which 
also prohibits deviations of 1/6 from the price. If ona'ah cannot be enforced because there is no such 
thing as a “true” price from which deviations of 1/6 are prohibited, then the same ought to be true of 
hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh. Indeed, we saw that Aaron Levine states (2012: 109, 112) that “What 
survives is not the 20% figure per se. This figure made sense only for the marketplace and economic 
conditions that existed at the time of the enactment of the ordinance.” And as we saw Warhaftig says 
(1988: end of sec. “C. Exceptions”) that “in most cases today it is impossible to establish a market 
price.” Furthermore, he states (ibid. s.v. “G. Contemporary Applications”) that “in a completely free 
market, where every merchant has his own price[, t]here is is no market price, and therefore no 
ona'ah.” And as we noted, Menachem Elon argues similarly (Shilo and Elon 2008). And if the 
nonexistence of a “true” price nullifies the prohibition of ona'ah, the same ought to be true of hafka'at 
she'arim / hayyei nefesh. This analogy is made easier by the fact that whereas ona'ah is a Torah-
prohibition, hafka'at she'arim is merely Rabbinic (Elon 2008, Warhaftig 1988: sec. “F. Fraud...”). 
Rabbinic laws are considered to carry less authority than Torah laws, and so nullifying a Rabbinic law 
is easier than nullifying a Torah law.
And there is one more candidate for a possible means by which to circumvent hafka'at she'arim: 
according to Menachem Elon (2008), “the rules concerning profiteering were only to take effect if 
imposed as measures of general application to all vendors, otherwise the individual could not be 
obliged to adhere to the permitted maximum rate of profit.” Similarly, according to Itamar Warhaftig 
(1987: end of sec. “4. Profit Limitation”), “a merchant is obligated to abide by this law only if there is a 
supervisory mechanism to insure that all merchants conform to its provisions. If, however, the market 
is unregulated one does not have to sell cheaper than others.” The idea seems to be that a merchant 
does not have to hamstring himself by abiding by these laws if his competitors are not. If any part of 
the market is unregulated, then the merchants in the regulated sector are not obligated to abide by the 
regulations either, lest they face competitive disadvantage. But in this era of globalization, the relevant 
market seems to be the world market as opposed to the local or even domestic market. Therefore, it 
would not be enough to enforce ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim in the land of Israel, because the 
inhabitants of the rest of the world remain unregulated. If these laws were enforced in Israel, then 
domestic Israeli commerce would face international competitive disadvantage. And as long as the rest 
of the world is not regulated by the Talmud's laws, then the market per se is not regulated by the 
Talmud either. Since the relevant market today is the world market, then the whole world must be 
regulated by the Talmud's laws in order for the Talmud's economic regulations to be binding for Jews in 
Israel. Since the non-Jewish world does not enforce these halakhic regulations, therefore, it is possible 
that no Jew is obligated to abide by them either. In an era of global trade, domestic interventionist 
regulations are liable to backfire even worse than in a closed domestic economy. In fact, according to 
some scholars, restrictions on international trade and attempts to insulate the domestic market from 
foreign competition were contributory causes to the outbreaks of WWI and WWII (Mises [1919] 1983, 
[1944] 1985: esp. chapter 3, parts 4-10; Cassel 1934).69 Aside from this, tariffs and other forms of 
protectionism lead to monopoly and reduced consumer welfare. Therefore, the State of Israel should 
not restrict international trade. Fostering competitive international trade requires that the State of Israel 
and the religious Jewish courts (batei din) not enforce the Talmud's regulations, lest Israeli merchants 
face competitive disadvantage from foreigners who are not so restricted.
However, none of this would help us account for communally-imposed price-controls nor the 
restrictions on speculation and middlemen. Because these laws have no reference to the 1/6 fraction with 
respect to the “true” price of a good, we cannot say that these laws are no longer binding on account of 
the nonexistence of such a price. Luckily, the corporate community's power to impose wage and price 
controls, this appears happily to be moribund and in desuetude, simply because modern Jewish 
communities are not constituted as they once were, to be independent politically authoritative bodies 
(Menachem Friedman 1982, 1986, 1993, 2004; cf. Tamari 1991: 15). Today, any given locale where 
Orthodox Jews live, tends to have a multiplicity of competing rabbis and rabbinical courts, and none of 
them has the sort of territorial monopoly on the legitimate use of force which would be necessary to 
impose wage and price controls. Therefore, they simply do not have the political authority necessary. 
Furthermore, the communities are so localized that it is likely that any attempt to impose the controls 
would become a self-evident failure. Imagine, for example, a synagogue in New York City attempting 
to dictate that every one of its congregants must pay half the going rate for food and must work for at 
least double the going rate of wages. This synagogue's members would immediately find themselves 
unable to purchase food or find employment in a competitive marketplace. Any Orthodox Jew who told 
the local supermarket that he is only allowed to pay half the going rate for food, or who told his 
employer that he must be paid double the going wage-rate for his occupation, would be laughed at, and 
it is unlikely that any synagogue would attempt to enforce such a decree. If the synagogue tried, the 
congregants would probably all vote with their feet and begin attending a synagogue which allowed 
them to purchase food and to find employment at the going market rates. Therefore, the communal 
price-controls are probably of no concern whatsoever in a modern world. Nevertheless, we should 
admit that once upon a time, when the Jewish communities were authoritative, the imposition of wage 
and price controls was politically possible and yet economically self-defeating. The communal controls 
may lie in desuetude today, but we should admit that when they were effective, they were based on 
erroneous economic science. If it ever becomes politically feasible to enforce these communal price-
controls again, we should be ready to renounce and denounce that power immediately. Meanwhile, the 
halakhic restrictions on speculation and middlemen would still appear to problematically possess 
binding legal authority.
Finally, there is one general solution to these problems which may prove useful. While Jewish 
tradition holds the Talmudic sages received a tradition of Jewish law that dates back to the revelation at 
Sinai – the Torah She'be'al Pe (“Oral Law”) – and which was embodied in the Talmud, there is also a 
tradition – albeit less universally accepted – that this Sinaitic Oral Law did not include scientific 
knowledge (Talmud, Pesahim 94b, quoted in Levi 2006 [1983]: 223f. and in Hirsch n.d.: 21, cited in 
Angel 2008: 16; Sherira Gaon, Otzar ha-Geonim, Gittin 68, par. 376, quoted in Levi 2006 [1983]: 223 
and in Student 2001; Maimonides, Moreh Nevukhim, pt. 3, end of ch. 14, quoted in Levi 2006 [1983]: 
223 and in Student 2001; Avraham ben ha-Rambam in Glick 1916: vii; Hirsch in Breuer 1975, Hirsch 
n.d.: 19, and Levi 2006 [1983]: 225; Haim David Halevy, Asei Lekha Rav 5:49, quoted in Angel 2008: 
16; Schachter 2014; Student 2001; Lew 1985: 3; cf. Student 2014). According to this view, the 
Talmudic sages combined their Sinaitic legal traditions with whatever knowledge of contemporary, 
secular science they possessed, to arrive at practical legal decisions. Therefore, their practical legal 
decisions could prove to be incorrect insofar as they were based – in good faith – on inaccurate 
scientific knowledge of the time. According to many – not all – contemporary Jewish legal authorities, 
it is sometimes – not always – permissible or even mandatory to change Jewish law whenever it is 
discovered that the scientific knowledge on which the law was based, is not accurate (Schachter 2014, 
Student 2001, Levi 2006 [1983]: 228; for the contrary view of Maimonides, see Buchman 2007, 
Glasner 1921, Student 2001). However, whether any particular halakhah can be altered in accordance 
with new scientific discoveries depends on the precise relationship between the specific halakhah in 
question and the related scientific principle; whether the halakhah may be modified must be decided on 
a case-by-case basis (Schachter 2014, Student 2001, Levi 2006 [1983]: 228). Therefore, we cannot 
simply state categorically that all these halakhic economic regulations were definitely based on ancient, 
inaccurate understandings of economics, and that therefore, these halakhot may be summarily 
abolished. But we can state that it is possible that these halakhot may be abolished on this basis. This 
deserves further study.
XII. Conclusion
Thus, we have seen that the halakhah's economic regulations, like all forms of price-control, 
would tend to be inefficient if enforced and would tend to accomplish the very opposite of their 
intention. While ona'ah may have only been intended to protect against asymmetric information, the 
hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh ordinance definitely constitutes a price-control on essential foodstuffs. 
Furthermore, there appears to be nobody who argues that the Talmud's condemnation and restriction of 
middlemen and speculators were anything other than what they appear to be. And the community's 
power to impose wage and price controls cannot be explained anyway as being anything else. 
But it may be the case that the laws of ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh are no 
longer applicable to a modern marketplace, and therefore, they are no cause for concern. If so, then the 
matter may rest there. The corporate Jewish community luckily appears to no longer possess the legal 
or political authority to exercise its power to impose wage and price controls, but we should still 
criticize that theoretical power in case the community ever regains its authority. Meanwhile, the 
halakhic restrictions on speculation and middlemen do appear to still possess legal authority, and 
therefore, these laws should be criticized. In all these cases, it is possible but not guaranteed, that some 
of these laws may be able to be abolished or nullified on the grounds that they were based, not on 
Sinaitic legal tradition, but on contemporary scientific understanding which has proven to be 
inaccurate.
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12 Hil. Mekhira 12:2-4; Shilo and Elon (2008); Epstein (1962: iv); Lew (1985: 42f.); Warhaftig (1988 
s.v. “A. Definition”); Tamari (1987: 97, 1991: 79); Levine (2012: 53).
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14 That the two laws – ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh – are related, is apparent from 
Maimonides's organization of Hil. Mekhira. In Hil. Mekhira chaps. 12 and 13, Maimonides 
discusses ona'ah. In the first two paragraphs of chap. 14, he turns to hafka'at she'arim. Then in 14: 
3-11, Maimonides discusses speculation, middlemen, hoarding, communal price-controls, and 
guilds. In the final paragraphs of chap. 14, i.e. par. 12-18, Maimonides returns to the topic of 
ona'ah. In other words, hafka'at she'arim is sandwiched in between two discussions of ona'ah, 
showing they are related. Meir Tamari's 1991 presentation is similar to Maimonides's in this regard; 
Tamari (1991: 68-72) first discusses hafka'at she'arim, then he turns (1991: 87) to ona'ah, and then 
he returns to hafka'at she'arim again (1991: 87f.), which this time he refers to – not entirely 
accurately – as “cost-related ona'ah.” Finally, he concludes with ordinary ona'ah again (1991: 88-
91). Elsewhere, Tamari (1987) seems to draw a sharper distinction, separating hafka'at she'arim 
(1987: 88-96) and ona'ah (1987: 96-100) into two separate sections. But even then ,Tamari (1987) 
briefly lumps ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim together into one single statement, saying (1987: 88), 
“the forms of price control discussed here all refer to basic commodities or their ingredients [i.e., 
hafka'at she'arim], with investment goods (such as land, slaves, or monetary instruments) excluded 
[i.e. ona'ah].” Meyer S. Lew does not clearly distinguish between hafka'at she'arim and ona'ah, 
shifting seamlessly from discussing the former (Lew 1985: 42) to the latter (Lew 1985: 43) without 
clearly distinguishing them. Warhaftig (1987) is mostly concerned with hafka'at she'arim while 
Warhaftig (1988) is mostly concerned with ona'ah, although the latter (Warhaftig 1988) returns to 
hafka'at she'arim near its conclusion (s.v. “F. Fraud, Profit Limitation, and Unfair Pressure”). 
Although Kleiman (1987) is predominately concerned with ona'ah, his brief allusion to hafka'at 
she'arim shows their close relationship: “The rather general, contrasting statement to the effect that profits (from 
trade?) should not exceed one-sixth (TB BB 90a), seems to have represented an attempt to interpret the ona'ah rules in an 
all-embracing manner” (Kleiman 1987: 36 n. 23).
15 Similarly, Warhaftig (1988: sec. “F. Fraud...”) says “Profit limitation is a rabbinic ordinance, 
whereas ona'ah is of Torah status,” and by “profit limitation” he means “the statute of Shmuel (BB 
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written Torah – the Torah She'bikhtav. The present author would like to suggest that ona'ah may be 
an example of a very special type of Torah law: the din muflah (“exceptional law”) (Faur 1979-80: 
230; cf. Maimonides's Introduction to the Mishnah and Introduction to the Mishneh Torah). As we 
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that Levine himself cited. Levine illustrates Judaism's deontological stance by exploring the Jewish 
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Levine speaks (2012: 33) of how the prohibition of lying “must be reconciled with” the duty to 
promote peace. The idea of two virtues apparently conflicting until they are reconciled, resembles 
the eudaimonistic concept of the virtues being mutually-determining, with the definition of every 
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